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 1 
Summary 
My research question is to what extent the right to abortion is protected in 
the Council of Europe system, with a focus on the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
 
First, theories and models of explanation are presented that are used to 
analyse the policies, legislation and cases on the issue abortion the Council 
of Europe. In short, these theories state that there is a structural 
discrimination against women. Because human rights have been created 
based on male norms, they do not take into consideration the situations that 
only women encounter, of which pregnancy is a prime example. For as long 
as women are outside the decision-making process, women’s rights will be 
viewed as secondary rights.  
 
In order to analyse the right to abortion, I have conducted an extensive 
literature study on the subject of gender equality, women’s rights as human 
rights, reproductive rights and the development of abortion. The thesis 
presents an analysis of the right to abortion in Europe as it has been 
expressed in the policy documents of the Council of Europe and the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights, and to what extent the right to 
abortion is protected in the Council of Europe system. A brief presentation 
of the history of abortion is used as an introduction to the subject, and with 
the theories and models of explanation, this introductory overview together 
with the national abortion legislation and policies in Ireland, Poland and 
Sweden gives the reader a better understanding of the cultural and 
legislative context that the cases from the European Court of Human Rights 
stem from. The comparison is important to illustrate how very different 
abortion legislation can be expressed in the Contracting States to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The policy decisions that have 
been adopted in the Council of Europe on the issues of gender equality, 
abortion and reproductive rights are studied and used to assess the stance of 
the Council. Furthermore, an overview of the development of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in regard to abortion is given and the doctrine 
of margin of appreciation is presented.  
 
Both Ireland and Poland have restrictive abortion legislations. In Poland, 
abortion is allowed on certain grounds; inter alia the risk to the life or the 
health of the mother, the severe malformation or ailment of the foetus or if 
the pregnancy is the result of a crime. In Ireland, no such exceptions exist 
except for in rare circumstances; the woman in need of an abortion must 
travel to another State to obtain the procedure. The European Court of 
Human Rights has found that there is no right to abortion in the Convention 
(stated in Tysiąc v. Poland, A, B and C v. Ireland, R.R. v. Poland and P. and 
S. v. Poland). However, if a Contracting State has enacted regulations that 
allow for abortion in certain circumstances, then the effective enjoyment of 
these rights must be guaranteed (stated in the cases Tysiąc v. Poland, R.R. v. 
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Poland and P. and S. v. Poland). Furthermore, the Court stated in Open 
Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland that the right to receive and impart 
information in regard to abortion under the article 10 right to freedom of 
expression was of crucial value to women, as it affected their health and 
well-being. Finally, although the Court have not found a European 
consensus on the idea of when life begins and therefore will not use the 
evolutive interpretation of the Convention to confer a right to abortion, it did 
leave the door open for potentially narrowing a State’s margin of 
appreciation in this regard.  
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Sammanfattning 
Min forskningsfråga är i vilken utsträckning rätten till abort är skyddad i 
Europarådets system, med fokus på rättspraxis från den Europeiska 
domstolen för de mänskliga rättigheterna. 
 
Teorier och förklaringsmodeller som används för att analysera policybeslut, 
lagstiftning och rättsfall gällande abort i Europarådet presenteras först. I 
korthet menar dessa teorier att det finns en strukturell diskriminering mot 
kvinnor. Eftersom mänskliga rättigheter har skapats utifrån manliga normer 
tar de inte hänsyn till de situationer som endast kvinnor möter, bland vilka 
graviditet är ett slående exempel. Så länge som kvinnor befinner sig utanför 
beslutsprocessen kommer kvinnors rättigheter att ses som sekundära 
rättigheter.  
 
För att analysera rätten till abort har jag genomfört en omfattande 
litteraturstudie om jämställdhet, kvinnors rättigheter som mänskliga 
rättigheter, reproduktiva rättigheter och abortens utveckling. I uppsatsen 
analyseras rätten till abort i Europa såsom denna har uttryckts i policybeslut 
från Europarådet och rättspraxis från den Europeiska domstolen för de 
mänskliga rättigheterna, och vidare analyseras i vilken utsträckning rätten 
till abort är skyddad i Europarådets system. En kort presentation av abortens 
historia introducerar ämnet. Tillsammans med de teorier och 
förklaringsmodeller som presenterats ger denna inledande översikt 
tillsammans med den nationella abortlagstiftningen och abortpolitiken i 
Irland, Polen och Sverige läsaren en bättre förståelse av det kulturella och 
rättsliga sammanhang som rättsfallen från Europadomstolen stammar från. 
Jämförelsen är viktigt för att belysa hur olikt abortlagstiftning kan uttryckas 
i de fördragsslutande staterna till den Europeiska konventionen om skydd 
för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna. De politiska 
beslut som har tagits i Europarådet inom ämnen som jämställdhet, abort och 
reproduktiva rättigheter studeras i uppsatsen och används för att bedöma 
Europarådets ställning till dessa frågor. Vidare ges en översikt över 
utvecklingen av Europakonventionen i fråga om abort och läran om margin 
of appreciation presenteras. 
 
Både Irland och Polen har mycket restriktiva abortlagstiftningar. I Polen är 
abort tillåtet under vissa omständigheter; t.ex. vid livsfara eller fara för hälsa 
för den gravida kvinnan, vid svår missbildning eller sjukdom hos fostret 
eller om graviditeten är resultatet av ett brott. I Irland finns inga sådana 
undantag utom i ytterst sällsynta fall. En kvinna i behov av abort måste resa 
till en annan stat för att få genomgå behandlingen. Europadomstolen har 
funnit att det inte finns någon rätt till abort i Europakonventionen (se Tysiąc 
v. Poland, A, B and C v. Ireland, R.R. v. Poland och P. and S. v. Poland). 
Om en avtalsslutande stat däremot har antagit regler som tillåter abort under 
vissa omständigheter, måste det faktiska åtnjutandet av dessa rättigheter 
garanteras (se Tysiąc v. Poland, R.R. v. Poland och P. and S. v. Poland). 
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Vidare har domstolen i Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland 
klarlagt att rätten att ta emot och sprida information i fråga om abort är av 
avgörande betydelse för kvinnor, eftersom det påverkar deras hälsa och 
välbefinnande, och alltså faller under rätten till yttrandefrihet i artikel 10 till 
Europakonventionen. Slutligen, även om domstolen inte har funnit ett 
europeiskt samförstånd över när livet anses börja och därför inte använder 
sig av evolutive interpretation av Europakonventionen för att läsa in en rätt 
till abort, så lämnades dörren öppen för att potentiellt minska en stats 
margin of appreciation i denna fråga. 
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1 Introduction  
 “The lawfulness of abortion does not have an effect on a woman’s need for 
an abortion, but only on her access to a safe abortion.”1 
 
In the fall of 2012, while writing an assignment in one of the courses at the 
Master Programme in International Human Rights Law in Lund, I stumbled 
across the case of P. and S. v. Poland. It might be an exaggeration to say I 
stumbled upon it, because I was reading about the subject of abortion and 
how it affects women’s lives. The case, with all its terrible and 
unimaginable twists and turns, caught my attention and it has stuck with me 
since. Because of my interest in women’s rights and human rights, it was 
easy to decide on the topic of my thesis. My aim is to shed light upon a 
question that I believe is of fundamental importance. 
 
In short, this thesis is about abortion. It is my view that if the State is the one 
to decide over a woman’s body, or the one to take away the woman’s choice 
over her own body, then the woman does not have self-determination or 
personal autonomy which is contrary to – and a violation of – women’s 
human rights. It is more than a question of reproductive rights; it is a 
question of gender equality. Human rights have been created based on male 
norms, and thus they do not take into consideration the situations that only 
women encounter, of which pregnancy is a prime example. 
 
When I spoke to my aunt about my research subject, she told me of one of 
her first memories in Lund as a student. In Lundakarnevalen 1966, the girls 
in one of the floats were wearing yellow sundresses, and big pregnant 
bellies, and suitcases – implying they were going to Poland for an abortion. 
A generation later, Polish women are fighting for their right to private life, 
and for the effective remedy of the rights they are guaranteed under the 
Convention – and if wealthy enough, some of them will be travelling to 
Sweden or other States to obtain the procedure. 
 
The purpose of human rights is to protect the human dignity of individuals 
against powers of the State, or those who act under the authority of the 
State. Without these human rights conventions, individuals would be 
vulnerable to intrusions of the government, and it is therein their 
significance lies. This is true also for those instances where the government 
is acting according to the preference of the democratic majority. Cook 
writes that human rights “are not dependent on privilege or the legal or 
democratic approval of others” 2 and that these rights give equal power to 
each person, including those who would otherwise be powerless. It is the 
inherent human dignity of every individual that lets them exercise their 
                                                 
1
 Resolution 1607 (2008) on the access to safe and legal abortion in Europe, adopted by the 
Assembly on 16 April 2008, para 4. 
2
 Cook, Rebecca J., “Human Rights and Reproductive Self-Determination” in American 
University Law Review, Vol. 44 (1994-1995), pp. 975-1016, p. 977f. 
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human rights.
3
 In States where the religious hierarchies instruct individuals 
on their duties and demand their obedience, the rights of international 
human rights treaties are hardly protected. Allowing the spiritual guidance 
of the religious authorities to co-exist with the protection of the individual’s 
right to reproductive choice is a challenge that is fundamental to meet for 
the advancement of reproductive rights.
4
 The preamble to the European 
Convention on Human Rights state that: 
 
Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and 
effective recognition and observance of the Rights therein declared;  
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement 
of greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by 
which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further 
realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms;  
Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms 
which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best 
maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and 
on the other by a common understanding and observance of the 
human rights upon which they depend […] 
 
In order to protect women’s reproductive rights, States need to meet the 
practical and strategic needs of women, work towards a gender equal society 
and conform to legally binding international human rights standards.
5
 The 
secondary status of women has been solidified by the separation of women’s 
rights from human rights, and this highlights the importance of recognizing 
the concern for specific women’s rights.6 
 
1.1 Purpose and Background 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the abortion policy and legislation in 
the Council of Europe and analyse how women in the Contracting States to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (hereafter cited as the European Convention on Human Rights or 
the Convention) are affected by this system. The focus of the discussion will 
be on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, for the 
determination of private life in the context of abortion.  
 
As the preface of the Irish Report of the Expert Group on A, B and C v. 
Ireland
7
 state, abortion is a difficult issue – both in itself and in discussing 
it. Abortion collects intense ethical, religious, political, social and intimate 
                                                 
3
 Cook, p. 977f. 
4
 Ibid., p. 978. 
5
 Ibid., p. 983f. 
6
 Bunch, Charlotte, ”Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist Perspective” in Peters, 
Julie and Andrea Wolper (eds.), Women’s Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist 
Perspectives (1995), Routledge, New York, pp. 11-17, p. 12. 
7
 “Report of the Expert Group on the Judgment in A, B and C V Ireland”, published by the 
Department of Health, Government of Ireland (November 2012). 
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personal issues in one single debate. I acknowledge that I am a white, 
middle-class woman, born and raised in a country which prides itself in 
being one of the most gender equal countries in the world. My concept of 
the world is unquestionably coloured by the values of the society I live in. 
This essay is moral and ethical in its perspective, because the issue of 
abortion is at heart a moral and ethical question. 
 
1.2 Research Question 
My research question is to what extent the right to abortion is protected in 
the Council of Europe system, with a focus on the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
 
1.3 Theory, Methodology and Outline 
To answer the research question, I have studied the documents of the 
Council of Europe on the subject, as well as looked at five prominent cases 
from the European Court of Human Rights. I provide a history of abortion 
as an introduction to the subject, and also make a comparative study of three 
of the countries within the Council of Europe System – Ireland, Poland and 
Sweden. My reasoning for choosing these countries is that they are on 
opposite sides of the spectrum when it comes to abortion legislation.  
 
In this thesis, I have made the assumption that there is a structural inequality 
between women and men. Further discussion on this is presented in chapter 
2. Although the material I have used is feminist, this essay employs no one 
definite feminist theory. Instead, I make references to different authors 
whose view or analysis on this subject matter makes for a coherent analysis.  
 
I have conducted an extensive literature study on the subject of gender 
equality, women’s rights as human rights, reproductive rights and the 
development of abortion. The literature I have used is not all written in a 
European perspective. Some of the literature is focused on other regions, 
while others are applied in a global context. The thesis presents an analysis 
of the right to abortion in Europe as it has been expressed in the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, and to what extent the right to 
abortion is protected in the Council of Europe System. I analyse the 
judgments, the domestic law and the European Convention on Human 
Rights. I use the legal dogmatic method to study the situation of women in 
this particular part of the law. 
 
In order to make a coherent point for the reader, the disposition is as 
follows: in chapter 2, the reader is presented with theories and models of 
explanation for the structural inequality between men and women. This, 
together with chapter 3, on the historical background on abortion forms the 
backdrop for the following chapters.  
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In chapter 4, three countries are studied more in-depth, namely Ireland, 
Poland and Sweden. Ireland and Poland are the most represented in the 
European Court of Human Rights case law on the issue of abortion. In this 
thesis, I compare the Irish and Polish domestic law to the Swedish domestic 
law. It is natural to choose Sweden as a comparison because I am Swedish, 
and because it is one of the countries with the most liberal view on abortion, 
as contrasted against the restricted views of Ireland and Poland.  
 
In chapter 5, the policy decisions on abortion and gender equality of the 
Council of Europe are presented, together with an overview of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in regard to abortion and the notion of margin 
of appreciation. The sub-chapter on gender equality is essential in that 
abortion as an expression of the right to private life goes hand in hand with 
the furtherance of gender equality. At the same time, gender equality 
policies are needed to advance women’s human rights, among them the 
right to private life. Chapter 6 then summarizes the relevant case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights on the issue of abortion. In chapter 7, I 
analyse my findings of abortion policy, legislation and case law through the 
theories presented in chapter 2.  
 
1.4 Delimitations and Definitions 
This thesis focuses on the European System. The main focus is therefore the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Council of Europe. As such, other legislation of international 
character is used for comparative purposes, but not studied in-depth. There 
is a whole battery of conventions and international instruments, especially 
within the system of the United Nations, that focus on the human rights of 
women and so also brings focus to the reproductive rights of women. 
Furthermore, I will not study the European Union, or the Community law. 
Although the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union might 
encompass this subject matter, it is not yet developed enough to be of use in 
this study. 
 
One of the imperfections of this thesis is that there is no focus on the 
differences between women. It is not my intention to treat women as a 
homogenous group, because nothing could be further from the truth. 
However, because there are endless variables to take into account, 
acknowledging all the differences within the group will be too ambitious a 
project. I ask the reader to keep in mind throughout the essay that women as 
a group are as diverse as there are women: ethnicity, class, social status and 
family relations are just a few of the aspects that make a difference to each 
and every one. Nevertheless, the question of abortion is common for all 
women, in that it potentially affects all women.  
 
In this thesis, because of time and space constraints, I do not study abortion 
in a perspective of the right to health, which is why I will not look into the 
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European Social Charter. Nor will I study sexual rights, even though they 
are intricately linked to reproductive rights. This thesis does not rely on 
statistics to compare and contrast the States – the difference in legislation, 
hospital routines and routines for reporting and registration of abortions 
make it a problematic task.
8
 Finally, the Protection of Life during Pregnancy 
Bill 2013 was presented by the Irish government on the 30
th
 of April, 2013. 
Because this was at the end stage of writing this thesis, the proposed 
legislation is acknowledged and discussed, but would have figured more 
prominently if the timing had been different. It is uncertain whether this new 
bill will be adopted, and if so, what impact it will have. 
 
In the analysis, several discussion points that have come up throughout the 
thesis are left outside the discussion because of time and space constraints. 
Although the issues are relevant and important, they are not the most 
relevant and the most important for this study. One discussion that has been 
left for another thesis is the claims of a foetal right to life. It is an interesting 
topic, and abortion can hardly be discussed without the mention of it, but it 
does not fall within the scope of this thesis. Another discussion that this 
thesis touches upon but will not go into further detail of is the discussion on 
gender equality. It is concisely presented and analysed in a manner to help 
the understanding of the discussion on the right to abortion under articles 8 
and 10 of the Convention, but it is not the main focus of this thesis. 
 
                                                 
8
 “Abort i Sverige”, Rapport nr: 27 (1994), Svensk förenings för Obstetrik och Gynekologi 
Arbets- och Referensgrupp ad hoc, p. 9 (In English: ”Abortion in Sweden”, Report no.27, 
Swedish Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Work and Reference group ad hoc, 
author’s translation). 
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2 Women’s Rights as Human 
Rights 
The theories presented in this chapter are used to analyse the policy 
decisions of the Council of Europe and the cases of the European Court of 
Human Rights, as well as serve as a foundation for a discussion on the 
national legislation of the Member States and the conflict of State 
sovereignty and the universality of human rights. The purpose of this 
chapter is to give a coherent presentation of the theories that is used 
throughout the thesis to analyse the policies, legislation and cases on 
abortion. There is an abundance of various feminist discourses; Gunnarsson 
and Svensson mention for example liberal feminism, religious and cultural 
feminism, radical feminism, post-modern feminism, and post-colonial 
feminism.
9
 I use influences from different writings, instead of focusing on 
one specific theory. My main idea is that “[a]ll human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights”10. It is important to note that there are 
different power relations between women as well as between women and 
men, and that these are based on differences of class, wealth, race and 
nationality.
11
 However, the focus of this thesis is the structural 
discrimination of women, especially in regard to the effective right to 
private life.  
 
In this part I use influences from other systems, such as the UN, to 
formulate coherent theories about women’s right as human rights, about the 
right to self-determination and reproductive rights. In the following chapter, 
abortion is introduced in a historical context. These two chapters together 
form the context for the later chapters in this thesis.  
 
2.1 Identifying Structures of Gender 
Inequality 
In order to identify the structural inequality between men and women, it is 
important to look at society at an above-individual level. The patterns that 
cannot be explained by studying the unique individual that participates in it 
show the structures of society. The idea is that the society forms the 
individual more than the individual forms the society.
12
 
 
                                                 
9
 Gunnarsson, Åsa and Eva-Maria Svensson, Genusrättsvetenskap (2009), Studentlitteratur, 
Lund, p. 120 (In English: Gender jurisprudence, author’s translation). 
10
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 1. 
11
 Charlesworth, ”Human Rights as Men’s Rights” in Peters, Julie and Andrea Wolper 
(eds.), Women’s Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives (1995), 
Routledge, New York, pp.103-113, p. 103. 
12
 Gunnarsson and Svensson, p. 141. 
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Feminist legal theorists question the “gender-less legal subject”, because 
people are not without a gender. Men and women are autonomous legal 
subjects, and men and women have different circumstances and living 
conditions. These differences are not rooted in biology, but in the socially 
constructed reality that we live in. Gender-neutral rules are prone to favour 
men, while women are getting the short end of the stick.
13
 Women’s rights 
are neither trivial nor secondary to the concerns of life and death – gender 
inequalities and discrimination kills.
14
 Oppression of women is political, and 
it results from the structural relationships of power, domination, and 
privilege that exist between men and women in society.
15
 The explanation 
for structures of gender inequality is the unequal power balance between the 
genders.
16
  
 
Gender is a product of psychology, culture and social construction, while 
sex is biological. Women suffer discrimination under both of these 
grounds.
17
 This discrimination is also present in reproductive rights, where 
women are portrayed as incapable of making good decisions concerning 
abortion. Instead, the legislation is patronizing and shaped by male values.
18
 
The development and enforcement of law has been male-gendered for a 
very long time. Women have traditionally not been present in the 
evolvement, due to explicit barriers that have obstructed and prevented them 
from taking part.
19
 
 
An interesting point that Stamatopoulou brings up is that the discrimination 
against women is often viewed as something that is so deeply embedded in 
history and tradition that it is not possibly to tackle it with human rights 
monitoring and the urgency that it imposes. However, the same argument is 
often made about racism, and the elimination of racial discrimination is, in 
fact, part of the human rights agenda.
20
 The problem with the inequality 
structures between men and women are that female subordination runs so 
deep that it is still viewed as natural or inevitable. It is not always seen for 
what it is, which is a politically constructed reality that is maintained by 
patriarchal interests, ideology, and institutions.
21
 The fact that legislation 
and social change that allow the control of women’s bodies into women’s 
hands are so strongly opposed in many States, show the importance of 
control over women.
22
 The structure and institutions of the international 
legal order mirror and cement the continued dominance of a male 
                                                 
13
 Gunnarsson and Svensson, p. 203f. 
14
 Bunch, Charlotte, “Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human 
Rights” in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 12 (1990), pp. 486-498, p. 488. 
15
 Ibid., p. 491. 
16
 Gunnarsson and Svensson, p. 142. 
17
 Cook, p. 982, see also Bunch (1990) p. 486. 
18
 Cook, p. 983. 
19
 Ibid., p. 985. 
20
 Stamatopoulou, ”Women’s Rights and the United Nations” in Peters, Julie and Andrea 
Wolper (eds.), Women’s Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives (1995), 
Routledge, New York, pp. 36-48, p. 36. 
21
 Bunch (1995), p. 14, see also Bunch (1990) p. 491. 
22
 Bunch (1995), p. 15, see also Bunch (1990) p. 491. 
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perspective. Both in States and in international organizations there is an 
appalling lack of women, effectively turning the discussion masculine and 
silencing women’s voices.23 
 
According to Stamatopoulou the weakness of the international community 
has been first and foremost in two areas; at the conceptual level and at the 
operational level. Conceptually, the international community (including 
States and NGOs) have historically failed to declare all women’s human 
rights concerns to be part of the international human rights law. 
Operationally, the issue of women’s human rights have been marginalized 
as they were not integrated into the mainstream human rights agenda.
24
 
Because of the long-term male domination of all major institutions of the 
international legal order and of national bodies that hold political power, 
traditionally issues that concern men are viewed as general human rights. 
This has led to “women’s concerns” being regarded as a distinct and limited 
category. Charlesworth calls for women’s equal representation in law-
making forums, as a beginning to mainstream the international legal order. 
Without the experiences of women being directly contributed to it, the 
international human rights law loses its claim to universal applicability.
25
 
Women must be made visible, and the concept and practice of human rights 
must be transformed to better address issues that are traditionally female-
gendered.
26
 Charlesworth finds it remarkable that although women make up 
more than half of the world's population this does not shine through in 
international human rights, producing an “impoverished, ineffective and 
lopsided jurisprudence”27. According to Gunnarsson and Svensson the 
objective and general gendered view is male in legislation and policies, 
making women the “opposite”, or le deuxième sexe, as Simone de Beauvoir 
expressed it.
28
 This sort of discrimination against any other group than 
women would be seen as a civil and political emergency.
29
  
 
2.2 The Right to Self-Determination 
Any discussion of abortion needs to put women at the centre of the 
discussion. Women are affected in ways that men are not, when their 
freedom, dignity and equality is continually compromised by law and by 
custom.
30
 If women are going to be in control of their own lives, they need 
the freedom and the ability to decide when and whom they get pregnant 
with. It is women who live with the consequences of pregnancy for the rest 
of their lives, and therefore women need to be at the centre of the decision-
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making.
31
 Women’s lives are actually in danger when legislation regulating 
reproductive rights is missing.
32
 According to Bunch, women’s bodies are 
the physical territory of women’s rights as human rights.33 Women’s voices 
have been absent from the discussion on reproductive self-determination. 
Reproduction has been addressed from a male perspective, and States have 
let perceptions and values permeate the debate that affords a strategic value 
to procreation, i.e. the strength of the community is measured in population 
numbers, and so high birth rates are preferred.
34
  
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women stated 
in its addendum
35
 that empowering women to take decisions about their 
fertility will lead to empowerment in other domains of their lives as well, 
giving the examples of decision-making within the household and the 
participation in economic and educational life.
36
 It refers to the Beijing 
Conference, which together with the International Conference on 
Development in Cairo were two of the most significant summits on 
reproductive rights during the end of the 20
th
 century. Smyth argues that the 
choice women have over their reproductive rights at once both shows the 
bodily and personal autonomy of women, and at the same time uphold the 
illusion that women can make these kinds of choices without thought to the 
economic, social and political context that they live in.
37
 She argues, like 
Petchesky, that choice is an illusion if you believe a choice can ever be 
made without a respect to the context. 
 
The relationship between reproductive rights and other human rights are 
fluid and interacting. For example, the right to education is relevant to the 
effective protection of reproductive rights.
38
 Eriksson notes that from the 
feminist viewpoint, it is obvious that decision-making on reproduction can 
only be voluntary when women have full knowledge about the 
consequences or ramifications of accepting or rejecting a particular method 
of family planning. Risks and benefits of medical procedures and 
contraceptives must be explained, and information and education about 
family planning should never be restricted.
39
 As Cook writes, it is essential 
for reproductive decision-making that there is a right to receive and impart 
information regarding sexual and reproductive health.
40
 Eriksson argues that 
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the inclusion of reproductive health as a fundamental component in 
women’s human rights should infer a right to non-directive counselling, thus 
enabling women to make free, fully informed choices.
41
 Petchesky argues 
that there is no such a thing as a “free” choice – it is always coloured by the 
social, economic and cultural context.
42
 Nevertheless, education and 
information is of fundamental importance. In Open Door and Dublin Well 
Woman v. Ireland the Court was of the view that although the foetus had a 
constitutional right to life, it did not exclude the right to receive information 
on how to obtain an abortion in another State.
43
 The ability to make 
decisions free from external pressure
44
 and in an informed manner on the 
number and spacing of one’s children is a basic human right, because it is a 
fundamental part of the contemporary concept of what makes a free 
individual. Reproductive freedom is sine qua non for the attainment of any 
genuine equality between men and women.
45
 
 
Every individual is presumed to have an autonomous sphere, in which the 
free will exists without being subject to external influences, according to 
Kant’s philosophical ideas about the autonomous individual. Because all 
individuals should be free and equal all individuals should be allowed to 
develop freely. The autonomous person must be aware of its own limitations 
and the co-existence with other autonomous persons, leading to a symbiosis 
between the autonomous ego and the common interests of the State. This 
autonomous individual is central for the idea of the individual’s human 
rights and the rule of law ideology.
46
 
 
The State should guarantee women the basic conditions necessary for 
reproductive autonomy. This includes removing the barriers for making 
choices, and that States promote and establish social and legal conditions 
that work towards a reproductive autonomy.
47
 Cook writes that: 
 
Reproductive security […depends] on respect for several related rights 
that are separately identified in human rights conventions. These 
rights include the right to life, the right to liberty and security of the 
person, the right to be free from torture and ill-treatment, the right to 
marriage and to found a family, and the right to enjoyment of private 
and family life.
48
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Protection and promotion of these rights – separately and collectively – 
advance the reproductive security that is fundamental for reproductive self-
determination to exist.
49
 In this thesis focus is placed on the right to private 
life and freedom of expression to mirror the discussion taking place in the 
European Court of Human Rights.  
 
Included in the concept of the right to private life (protected under article 8 
of the Convention) is the right of the individual to choose freely on matters 
of procreation.
50
 For women to be able to exercise their right to their own 
choice in family planning, the right to implement their decision is of crucial 
importance. Without effective exercise the abstract right to make the 
decision is meaningless.
51
 The control over one’s body is a condition for full 
human participation in social and communal life, and for women this means 
also the control over if, and when, and under what circumstances to have 
children.
52
  
 
The difficulty in balancing competing interests against each other, is 
determining which one weighs the heaviest. The liberal view, focusing on 
the interests of the individual, is competing against the communitarian 
ideals, whereby the interests of the community should prevail. Eriksson 
writes that it is to what degree it is possibly to restrict an individual’s human 
rights and on what grounds the restriction is justified that becomes the 
debate.
53
  
 
Pragmatically, it is a win-win situation for both the individual and the 
community if women are afforded control over their reproductive choices 
and their bodies. It is beneficial for the women, for their families and for the 
society as a whole.
54
  
 
2.3 Public and Private Spheres 
“The personal is political”55, and in the policies, legislations and cases that 
are presented in this thesis, the highly private choice of abortion is heavily 
politicised. Although the choice should be private, the States need to ensure 
the availability of, and the access to, abortion services. Feminist theory and 
law collide because the former want to affect the latter, and lead to social 
change. Feminist theories are useful to provide tools for how to examine and 
develop law, e.g. through the “law in context”-movement, and the socio-
legal or critical studies of law. Because the personal is political, feminist 
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analysis is applicable to law in its operational and practical context. The role 
of law in social change is important, although the social change is not made 
from logic found within the law itself.
56
  
 
There exists a dichotomy about the relation between the public and the 
private, which is central in a discussion of gender inequality. It is also a 
dichotomy about dependence and independence, where women are viewed 
to be dependent on men. In such a view of the society, women are not 
autonomous; they are restricted in relation to men.
57
 In this view, women 
are therefore subordinate to men. States need to take the responsibility for 
protecting women’s human rights and stop perpetuating these ideas.58 
 
Unless reproductive rights of women are secured in the private sphere, other 
human rights of women will remain unobtainable.
59
 Often, it is the 
preservation of family and culture that has been used as a rationale for the 
denial of human rights to women.
60
 The view of the public and the private 
as separate spheres is used to justify the subordination of women, and in its 
extension to exclude the private sphere from the reach of human rights and 
public scrutiny.
61
 The international human rights law operates, like many 
national legal systems, in the public sphere. The public sphere is the 
government, politics, economics and the workplace – it is the sphere 
traditionally associated with men. This makes the international human rights 
principles inherently biased against women. The private sphere – where 
most violations against women’s rights generally occur – is the home, 
hearth and family, and it is traditionally outside the scope of national and 
international legislation and principles.
62
 Mullaly makes the point that the 
problem does not lie in the rights discourse per se, it is the gendered 
division – the dichotomy between public and private – that hampers the 
pursuit of equality through rights. This division allows discriminatory 
practices to continue unrestricted in the areas of life that falls under the 
“private” scope.63 It is clear that in the international community women’s 
rights are human rights. However, the socially constructed division between 
private and public spheres must be counteracted. If the division into private 
and public was to be removed, then it would be possible to counteract the 
silence on the matter that protects the continuance of human rights 
violations that are based in cultural, religious and traditional values and 
prejudices.
64
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3 A Short Historical 
Background of Abortion – 
Choice and Consequences 
In the previous chapter, the theories for analysing the material in this thesis 
were presented. This chapter gives a historical background of abortion and 
the choice surrounding it, as well as problematizes restrictive abortion 
legislation. This chapter serves as an introductory overview, to help the 
reader connect the dots. This chapter is based in a literature study on the 
subject, as well as the reports of the World Health Organization and the 
Swedish Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology, and the ICPD Programme 
of Action. The next chapter presents a more detailed discussion on the 
national legislation and the development of the abortion policy in Ireland, 
Poland and Sweden, providing a backdrop for the cases and thus furthering 
a deeper understanding for the cases and the connection to the Council of 
Europe. 
 
3.1 Historical Background of Abortion 
In 1992 David noted that the lowest abortion rates and ratios were found in 
the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. He drew the conclusion 
that it is linked to societies where sexuality is more openly accepted as part 
of a healthy lifestyle, and for which individuals are expected to assume 
personal responsibility, inter alia through effective contraceptive practice. 
Education on sex is promoted from an early age in these countries. In 
Eastern Europe, abortion has been preferred to modern contraceptives, 
which remains a taboo topic together with sexuality.
65
 Since David’s article, 
the legislation in Poland has made a volte-face, and now the country is 
sporting one of the most restrictive abortion legislations in Europe (cf. infra, 
chapter 4).  
 
According to David, there were few – if any – legal restrictions on abortion 
in Rome and throughout most of the Roman Empire’s existence. The foetus 
was believed to be part of the woman’s body, and so women could request 
its removal.
66
 Ross agrees with this view, and writes that the attitude of 
restrictive abortion is not from the ancient Roman or Greek. Ancient 
religion did not forbid abortion. In the cases where abortion was prosecuted, 
it was mainly as a violation of the father’s right to offspring. Instead of 
leaving thoughts to foetal rights, the opposition against abortion was mainly 
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because of the serious health risks the procedure posed to the mother.
67
 
Today, the health risk posed to the mother is a reason abortion should be 
lawful. In States where abortion is not legal, women will find other ways to 
obtain the procedure, inter alia through “back alley clinics”. Where there 
are no lawful options, unsafe and clandestine abortions will prosper.
68
  
 
Religion is an important part of the discussion surrounding abortion. Ross 
asks if every woman should be able to choose her own religious view (and 
her own position on abortion), or if States should allow the religious views 
of the majority to decide for all the women in the country what they are 
allowed to do in this regard, as the State laws then mirror and enact these 
religious views?
69
 This is discussed in the analysis (cf. chapter 7). The 
number of abortions in a society is not only connected to the legislation, but 
also on the level of urbanisation, education, religion, culture and the socio-
economic context.
70
 There are many questions concerning abortion. For 
example, who has the right to choose an abortion? And who should fund it? 
When is it okay to have an abortion? When is it not? Like Susan Deller Ross 
explains, between the two extremes lie many variations.
71
  
 
3.2 Abortion and Choice 
There are different reasons as why to have an abortion. Dividing them into 
crude categories, there are medical grounds, social grounds and eugenic 
grounds. For the medical grounds, there are for example the cases of when 
the pregnant woman’s life or health is in danger. The social grounds can be 
that the woman is not in a position, e.g. financially or psychologically to 
care for a child. The eugenic grounds are some of the most controversial 
because it is the way to avoid hereditary diseases – it can be considered a 
form of human engineering and shows a lack of value given to some 
individuals, especially when combined with forced sterilization (cf. chapter 
5.3). 
 
The choice to have an abortion can be both controversial and the most 
logical thing in the world. Petchesky writes that even if all circumstances 
are the same for two different women, her consciousness about abortion can 
at the same time be multi-layered and contradictory.
72
 There are ethical and 
pragmatic-practical considerations to weigh against one another, and this 
leads to the paradoxical idea that “the abortion was wrong, but it was the 
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right thing to do”.73 Some, like Denbow, call for restrictive abortion 
legislation, arguing that taking the decision away from women actually 
favours their autonomy, because they are no longer “forced” by society to 
choose a certain option. Her example is a woman who wants to carry her 
pregnancy to term, but feels the need to have an abortion to conform to the 
societal view.
74
  
 
3.3 Consequences of Restrictive Abortion 
Legislation 
In 2007, the World Health Organization estimated that a woman dies every 
eighth minute in a developing country as a result of unsafe abortion.
75
 An 
unsafe abortion, defined by the WHO, is a “procedure for terminating an 
unintended pregnancy carried out either by persons lacking the necessary 
skills or in an environment that does not conform to minimal medical 
standards, or both”76. Broadly categorized, there are four categories for 
traditionally inducing an abortion, which are: 
 
1. Oral and injectable medicines; 
2. Vaginal preparations; 
3. Introduction of a foreign body into the uterus, and 
4. Trauma to the abdomen.77 
 
Most of these traditional “remedies” are dangerous to the woman’s well-
being, and most of them even constitute a serious threat to her life. The 
number of pregnancies that end in voluntary abortion every year is 
approximately 42 million. Out of these, around 20 million are done outside 
of the national legal systems. Illegal, clandestine abortions are often 
performed by unskilled providers, or in unhygienic conditions, or both.
78
 
Around 70 000 women die every year as a result from unsafe abortion. The 
number of women who are left with temporary or permanent disability due 
to unsafe abortion is close to five million.
79
 One in four women that have an 
unsafe abortion is likely to face severe complications, and apart from risking 
the lives and health for millions of women, this also puts a strain on the 
health care facilities, which puts a heavy demand on often scarce 
resources.
80
 
                                                 
73
 Furedi, Ann, “Wrong but the Right Thing to Do: Public Opinion and Abortion” in Lee, 
Ellie (ed.), Abortion Law and Politics Today (1998), Macmillan Press Ltd, Hampshire, pp. 
159-171, p. 159. 
74
 Denbow, Jennifer, “Abortion: When Choice and Autonomy Conflict” in Berkley Journal 
of Gender, Law and Justice, Vol. 20 (2005), pp. 216-228, p. 220ff. 
75
 “Unsafe abortion – Global and regional estimates of the incidence of unsafe abortion and 
associated mortality in 2003”, 5th ed. World Health Organization (2007), preface. 
76
 “Unsafe abortion”, p. 1. 
77
 Ibid. 
78
 Ibid. 
79
 Ibid., p. 5. 
80
 Ibid., p. 1. 
 22 
 
The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) 
adopted the Cairo Programme For Action, in which it was recommended 
that: 
 
“All Governments and relevant intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations are urged to strengthen their commitment 
to women’s health, to deal with the health impact of unsafe abortion 
as a major public health concern and to reduce the recourse to abortion 
through expanded and improved family-planning services. Prevention 
of unwanted pregnancies must always be given the highest priority 
and every attempt should be made to eliminate the need for 
abortion.”81 
 
The paragraph started out, however, by stating that in no case should 
abortion be promoted as a method of family planning. The Cairo 
Programme of Action is not legally binding, but because it has been 
endorsed by a large majority of the governments (approximately 180) it 
bears great authority.
82
 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has often favoured the aphorism that 
individual liberties must have a broad interpretation, whereas restrictions 
upon these liberties require a restrictive interpretation.
83
 It was in the 1994 
Cairo Programme for Action that the term “reproductive health” was set out 
in a universal governmental programme for the first time.
84
 Reproductive 
health is defined as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters 
relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes”85. 
Implicit in the term is the prevention, or termination, of a mistimed and/or 
unwanted pregnancy.
86
 According to Eriksson, the political controversy as 
to the legality of abortion was sidestepped in the Cairo Conference, because 
it was presented as an issue of reproductive health, not reproductive right, 
and as such the focus was shifted to the serious health effects of illegal, 
clandestine and unsafe abortions. By aiming to remove the existing legal 
restrictions to abortion, it is possible that the intention of the drafters of the 
ICPD programme was that by ensuring the legality of all abortions, all 
abortions would be safe.
87
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4 Abortion in a Comparative 
Perspective – An Overview of 
Ireland, Poland and Sweden 
In the previous chapter, the historical background of abortion was presented, 
together with the choice an abortion represents and the consequences of 
illegal or clandestine abortions. For a better understanding of the cultural 
and legislative context that the cases from the European Court of Human 
Rights that are presented in chapter 6 come from, this chapter provides an 
overview of the abortion legislation and policy in Ireland and Poland. The 
chapter also provides an overview of the Swedish abortion legislation. As a 
State with liberal abortion legislation will be used to compare and contrast 
against the aforementioned legislations. I limit myself to these countries 
because they are the relevant ones to the cases presented and for the purpose 
of this thesis.
88
 
 
The purpose with this chapter is to provide a basis for a comparison on the 
development of the legislation in Sweden, Ireland and Poland. It is also 
important to demonstrate just how very different forms abortion legislation 
takes in the Contracting States to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. For this chapter I have used legal dogmatic method, studying the 
legislation, case law and travaux préparatoires of the States. I have 
complemented this with a literature study. This chapter is meant to be an 
overview of the current legal situation of abortion in these particular 
Member States. This will then tie in with the chapter 6 which summarizes 
the most important cases of the European Court of Human Rights on this 
issue.  
 
4.1 Ireland 
Ireland is one of the few countries in Europe that still has a very restrictive 
abortion legislation. The reason for this is the heavy presence of the church 
– the majority of the Irish people are Roman Catholic, with almost eighty-
five per cent of the population self-identifying as Roman Catholic in the 
2011 Census.
89
 In 1983, a total ban on abortion and an explicit right to life 
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of the foetus was adopted into the State’s Constitution, as the Eighth 
Amendment. In the end of the 1980s, Ireland was one of the few Western 
European States where abortion was illegal in all instances
90
, and it had 
never before that been available. This did not mean that abortions were non-
existent; it just meant that women travelled across borders – usually to Great 
Britain – to have the procedure done.91  
 
The use of non-medical contraception was banned for use by non-married 
couples (and required a doctor’s permit) until 1985, when a liberalization of 
the law was passed by a narrow parliamentary majority. There had been 
intense opposition from the Catholic Church on the matter, and this was the 
first time State and Church went head to head.
92
  
 
Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland, stands as follows: 
 
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to 
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate 
that right. [Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 7 October 
1983] 
 
This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and 
another state. [Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 23 
December 1992] 
 
This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in 
the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, 
information relating to services lawfully available in another state. 
[Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 23 December 1992] 
 
The eighth amendment of the Constitution Act acknowledged the right to 
life of the unborn, with due regard to the equal right of the mother. An 
additional three amendments were proposed in 1992 (cf. infra).  
 
The X case
93
 from 1992 is the landmark case on abortion in Ireland. A 14-
year old girl was allegedly raped by her friend’s father. When she found out 
that she was pregnant, she and her parents decided to travel to England for 
an abortion. They asked the gardaí [the police] if there would be any way to 
test the aborted embryo for DNA, and as such use it as evidence against the 
alleged rapist. The gardaí informed the Director of Public Prosecutions who 
in turn communicated it to the Attorney General, resulting in an injunction 
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against the family, prohibiting them to travel outside Ireland for 9 months. 
This effectively meant that the girl was not allowed to obtain an abortion. It 
was shown in court that there was a real and substantial risk that the 
pregnant girl was going to end her life by suicide if she could not obtain an 
abortion. The Irish Supreme Court interpreted article 40.3.3 of the 
Constitution and ruled that abortion is allowed in cases where the mother’s 
life is at risk, even if this risk is constituted by suicide – that is, the mother 
herself is the threat to her life. The reasoning of the Court was that when 
there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother, and the risk can 
only be averted with an abortion, the abortion is lawful. However, this 
balancing of the rights according to article 40.3.3 still meant that the 
procedure had to be done outside of Ireland because the abortion in itself 
would not be legal in the State. If the woman’s life was not at any “real and 
substantial risk”, a woman could still be prevented from travelling to 
another country, because the right to life of the foetus took precedence over 
the mother’s right to travel.94 Three amendments to the Constitution on the 
issue of abortion were held up for voting following the X case
95
, where the 
two adopted amendments and the X case together resulted in a slightly less 
restricted abortion legislation. The Twelfth Amendment was rejected in 
1992, which would have restricted the right to abortion. It would have 
limited the effect of the X case, excluding suicide as grounds for abortion. 
At the same time the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution Act were passed. The Thirteenth Amendment provided that 
article 40.3.3 does not limit the freedom to travel between Ireland and 
another State, and the Fourteenth Amendment provided that the article does 
not limit the freedom to obtain or make available information relating to 
services lawfully available in another State.
96
 It is important to note here 
that the application for the case of Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. 
Ireland to the European Court of Human Rights was made in 1988. When 
the case was decided by the Court in October 1992, these amendments were 
only two months away in the national arena. 
 
After the 1992 case, a bill
97
 was introduced in 2001 to change the 
legislation. According to the Taoiseach [the Prime Minister] the government 
was of the view that if the opinion of the X case was upheld, it would be a 
slippery slope, inevitable and unstoppable, to social abortion.
98
 The proposal 
meant that the right to abortion would not be recognized if it was the woman 
herself that was the risk to her life.
99
 In 2002, a referendum was held for the 
proposal for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution Act, which 
would further restrict abortion under the “Protection of Human Life in 
Pregnancy Act”. The act itself would not be added to the constitution, but 
                                                 
94
 Mills, Eithne and James McConvill, “The 2002 Irish Abortion Referendum: A Question 
of Constitutionalism and Conscience” in European Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 4 (2002), 
pp. 481-494, p. 484f. 
95
 Ibid., p. 485. 
96
 Ibid., p. 486. 
97
 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment of the Constitution (Protection of Human Life in 
Pregnancy) Bill (2001). 
98
 Smyth, p. 337. 
99
 Ibid., see also Mills and McConvill p. 486f. 
 26 
the proposed amendment would have entailed that it accrued the same status 
as a constitutional amendment. The proposed amendment was rejected.
100
 
 
In October 2012, a woman died at a hospital when medical staff refused her 
an abortion. Mrs Halappanavar arrived at the hospital complaining of back 
pain. When it was determined she was miscarrying, her demand for an 
abortion was not met. She contracted septicaemia (blood poisoning) as a 
result and died on the 28
th
 of October.
101
  
 
An expert report was ordered by the Irish Government in November 2011 
with the task of examining the judgment in A, B and C v. Ireland of the 
European Court of Human Rights (discussed in chapter 6.3) and to elucidate 
its implications for the provision of health care services to pregnant women 
in Ireland. In November 2012 the Expert Group appointed by the Irish 
Government published their report
102
 on how Ireland should comply with 
the ruling in the case A, B and C v. Ireland. This report was published a 
month after the death of Mrs Halappanavar. The expert group recommended 
a series of options on how to implement the judgment taking into account 
the constitutional, legal, medical, and ethical considerations involved in the 
formulation of public policy in this area and the over-riding need for speedy 
action.
103
 
 
As recently as April 30, 2013, the new abortion legislation was proposed 
called the Protection of Life during Pregnancy Bill
104
. In the bill abortion to 
save the life of the woman is permitted, but other than that no significant 
changes are made to the current status of abortion in Ireland; rather the bill 
aims to make the legislation clarified and more accessible. A person found 
guilty of destroying unborn life with the intent of doing so faces a prison 
term of up to 14 years.
105
 If, however, the reason for the abortion or 
termination of pregnancy is the real and substantial risk of loss of the 
pregnant woman’s life and this risk only can be averted by that medical 
procedure, it is not an offence. Two medical practitioners must jointly 
certify this in good faith, and consult with to woman’s general practitioner. 
In an emergency, the procedure may be carried out by a medical 
practitioner, who in good faith believes there is an immediate danger to the 
woman’s life, and the procedure is immediately necessary to save the life of 
the woman.
106
 Risk of life of the woman through self-imposed harm does 
not qualify as a risk to life (in an emergency or not) unless one 
obstetrician/gynaecologist and two psychiatrists (preferably in consultation 
with the woman’s general practitioner) certify in good faith that the life of 
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the woman is at a real and substantial risk.
107
 The bill has not yet been 
adopted. 
 
4.2 Poland 
Poland has peculiarly moved from having one of the most liberal abortion 
legislations in the world to demonstrating one of the most restrictive. This 
sub-chapter gives an overview of the development of the Polish abortion 
legislation, trying to explain why it developed in the way it did, and show 
what today’s legislation looks like. Unlike Ireland, which has had a 
restrictive abortion legislation throughout, Poland actually had one of the 
most liberal legislations in the world until the change in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  
 
Abortion was permitted in the 1932 Penal Code if it was the result of a 
criminal offense or the mother’s life was in danger. This expanded to 
include social and economic reasons in 1956, with the introduction of the 
Abortion Admissibility Act. The final decision was still the doctor’s. In 
1959, the law was changed to make abortion administered on the woman’s 
application, effectively making abortion available on demand. The medical 
professionals would decide on a case by case basis because there was no set 
time limit. There was no feminist motivation behind this very liberal 
change, which was instead motivated by the widespread Soviet bloc policy 
of integrating more women in the workforce. Because of the difficulty in 
obtaining contraceptives, abortion seems to have been widely used in place 
of birth control.
108
  
 
When the regime fell in 1989, and Soviet’s political influence in Poland was 
diminished, the Catholic Church made a claim to power in the country. 
Because of its doctrinal opposition to abortion, and as a part of the strategy 
to become a stronger institutional actor and to manifest its hold on its 
followers the episcopate sought a legal ban on the procedure.
109
 In 1989, 
just before the first parliamentary elections following the new political 
freedom, a draft law submitted that proposed a restriction of abortion rights, 
making it legal only when the mother’s life was in danger. An illegal 
abortion was to be punished with up to two years in prison. Contraceptives 
like intrauterine devices and pills would be illegal.
110
 Even though the 
initiative was sponsored by the Church, the public rejected it. It is notable, 
because at that time ninety-five per cent of Poland’s population was 
baptized Catholic. However, because of the difficulty in obtaining other 
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forms of birth control, the effect of an abortion ban would be significant on 
the options of fertility control that women could access. In the Polish 
Parliament the bill was rejected. Although most hospitals had by this point 
in time stopped performing abortions, it was the first setback of the Catholic 
Church in the post-communist era.
111
 The winds turned quickly, however, 
and by 1990 three medical opinions and a consultation with a State-
approved psychologist were needed to authorize a request of abortion, 
greatly restricting the access to affordable abortion services. If the request 
was made on non-medical grounds, the physicians were allowed to refuse to 
issue the certificate, and State hospitals had to increase their fee for the 
procedure. In May 1992 a new medical code of ethics arrived, only allowing 
for abortion to be performed if the pregnancy either threatened the life or the 
health of the mother, or if it was the result of a criminal act.
112
 Today’s 
abortion legislation in Poland is The Family Planning (Protection of the 
Human Foetus and Conditions Permitting Pregnancy Termination) Act
113
 
and was passed by Parliament in 1993 (hereafter called “the 1993 Act”). The 
1993 Act provided that legal abortion is possible only until the twelfth week of 
pregnancy in cases where the pregnancy endanger the mother’s life or health, or 
in cases where prenatal tests or other medical findings indicate a high risk that 
the foetus will be severely and irreversibly damaged or suffering from an 
incurable life-threatening disease, or if there are strong grounds for believing 
that the pregnancy is a result of rape or incest. In January 1997 an amended text 
of the 1993 Act came into force providing that pregnancy could also be 
terminated during the first twelve weeks in cases where the mother either 
suffered from material hardship or was in a difficult personal situation. 
However, in December 1997 further amendments were made to the text of the 
1993 Act, following a judgment of the Constitutional Court given in May 1997 
in which the Court held that the provision legalizing abortion on grounds of 
material or personal hardship was incompatible with the Constitution as it stood 
at that time.114 Section 1 provided at that time of when the cases Tysiąc v. 
Poland, R.R. v. Poland and P. and S. v. Poland that “every human being 
shall have an inherent right to life from the moment of conception”.  
 
Section 2 (a) of the 1993 Act reads:  
 
The State and local administration shall ensure unimpeded access to 
prenatal information and testing, in particular in cases of increased 
risk or suspicion of a genetic disorder or development problem or of 
an incurable life-threatening ailment. 
 
Section 4(a) of the 1993 Act reads, in its relevant part:  
 
1. An abortion can be carried out only by a physician where  
1) pregnancy endangers the mother’s life or health;  
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2) prenatal tests or other medical findings indicate a high risk 
that the foetus will be severely and irreversibly damaged or 
suffering from an incurable life-threatening ailment; 
3) there are strong grounds for believing that the pregnancy is 
a result of a criminal act.  
2. In the cases listed above under 2), an abortion can be performed 
until such time as the foetus is capable of surviving outside the 
mother’s body; in cases listed under 3) above, until the end of the 
twelfth week of pregnancy.  
3. In the cases listed under 1) and 2) above the abortion shall be 
carried out by a physician working in a hospital. 
(…) 
5. Circumstances in which abortion is permitted under paragraph 1, 
sub-paragraphs 1) and 2) above shall be certified by a physician other 
than the one who is to perform the abortion, unless the pregnancy 
entails a direct threat to the woman’s life. 
 
It is a criminal offence to perform a termination of pregnancy in breach of 
the conditions specified in the 1993 Act. It is punishable under article 152 § 
1 of the Polish Criminal Code. Anyone who terminates a pregnancy in 
violation of the Act or assists such a termination may be sentenced to up to 
three years’ imprisonment. There is no criminal liability for the pregnant 
woman herself for an abortion performed in contravention of the 1993 
Act.
115
 
 
Although the 1993 Act does have legitimate grounds for abortion, hurdles 
are set up at every step of the way. Three physicians need to certify the 
grave threat to a woman’s life or health that would allow for an abortion. A 
public prosecutor has to confirm the case of rape or incest. For prenatal 
testing to be carried out there must be good reason to suspect foetal 
defects.
116
 
 
The 1993 Act has also been called “the Anti-Abortion Act”, and rather than 
eliminate the practice of abortion, it has instead made the practice take place 
outside the law, with an estimated 80,000 to 200,000 illegal abortions being 
performed each year. The expensive abortions are often performed in unsafe 
conditions, leading to unnecessary suffering and death. Because of the rising 
prices of illegal abortions, women who are economically constrained are 
prevented from accessing abortion services.
117
 The official numbers showed 
a marked decrease in the number of abortions carried out in the early 1990s. 
However, the number of reported miscarriages skyrocketed. Kulczyckis’s 
interviews with gynaecologists and other specialists in the years 1991 to 
1994 suggested that women could obtain abortions under pretext.
118
 In the 
years following the new restricted legislation, the number of abandoned 
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children and infanticides rose significantly, as did the number of children 
left in hospitals.
119
 Kulczycki concludes that the 1993 Act “gives legal 
protection to the beginning of human life in preference to the autonomy of 
the woman”120. 
 
As to the Polish Constitution, its two relevant articles read: 
 
The Republic of Poland shall ensure the legal protection of the life of 
every human being.
121
 
 
Everyone shall have the right to legal protection of his private and 
family life, of his honour and good reputation and to make decisions 
about his personal life.
122
 
 
According to the Central Statistical Office in Poland, the vast majority – 
almost ninety per cent – of the population are affiliated with the Roman 
Catholic Church.
123
 This can be compared to the Roman Catholic population 
in Ireland (cf. supra). 
 
It is important to note that even though abortion was legal in 1956 and 
onward in Poland, the safety and quality of abortions varied.
124
  
 
4.3 Sweden 
In Sweden, there was a public debate on the future of the country in the 
1930s. A large part of Sweden’s working and reproductive population had 
emigrated, leading to public policy encouraging marriage and a higher 
number of children. At the same time, family planning was encouraged, and 
arguments in favour of abortion were heard.
125
 There was an estimated 
number of 20 000 illegal abortions per year in Sweden, although it was not 
until the 1
st
 January 1939 that abortion was legalized.
126
 Because of the 
dangers associated with abortions the approach was initially to ban and 
discourage them. An investigation for abortion legislation in 1934 observed 
that the threat of punishment did not deter those seeking abortion. Instead, 
the number of abortions seemed to go up during these years. The 
investigation established that the social conditions that made women seek 
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abortion (such as the stigma surrounding children born outside of wedlock 
and the difficulty in raising children alone) should be improved.
127
  
 
In the Abortion Act of 1938 termination of pregnancy was allowed if the 
pregnant woman’s life or health was in danger or if the pregnancy was the 
result of a crime. Eugenic grounds for abortion were also allowed in the 
1938 Act. If an abortion was performed because of the unfit hereditary 
character of the mother, she was required to undergo sterilization at the 
same time. The time limit for abortion was twenty weeks of gestation, 
unless the health of life of the woman was in danger. The adopted 
legislation ended up being more restrictive than the proposed law of the 
1934 investigation.
128
 Socio-medical grounds were introduced in 1946.
129
 
The reasoning behind this was that the 1938 Act was being interpreted too 
restrictively, and the social reform the 1934 investigation had called for had 
not taken place.
130
 In 1963, the abortion legislation was widened again to 
include deformities of the foetus. This was following the Thalidomide 
scandal
131
 in the early 1960s and in part also because of rubella in pregnant 
women.
132
  
 
A motion to the Liberal Youth Party in the beginning of the 1960s said ”I 
believe that women must be able to decide over her own body, therefore I 
demand the right to free abortion”133. Apart from the resistance from the 
Church, the opposition bore patronizing ideas and an overly trusting 
confidence for authorities, claiming women were not able to make the 
choice of abortion themselves. Because of the limited access to abortion in 
Sweden, when it became known that Poland had at the time “free abortion” 
at the woman’s application (cf. supra, chapter 4.2), many women travelled 
there to have the procedure done. This led to the public opinion turning 
quickly to support free abortion and the current legislation was being 
questioned.
134
 According to Nelson, the practice of abortion in Sweden 
predated the legislation of 1974. The statistical material indicates that when 
the Parliament considered the bill, abortions on demand were already being 
carried out.
135
 The transition from the 1938 act to the 1974 act was 
consequently reasonably smooth. 
 
The relevant parts of the current Swedish Abortion Act
136
 is presented 
below. It is the 1974 law with subsequent amendments: 
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1 § At the request of a woman that her pregnancy shall be terminated, 
abortion may be performed if the procedure is made by the end of the 
eighteenth week of gestation and it is not likely to have present a 
serious risk to her life or health because of any medical condition of 
the woman. Act (1995:660). 
2 § If a woman requests an abortion or if a question of termination of 
pregnancy according to § 6 has risen, she shall be offered counselling 
before proceeding with it. Act (1995:660). 
3 § After the end of the eighteenth week of pregnancy abortion may 
be performed only if the woman receives a permit from the National 
Board of Health and Welfare for the procedure. Such authorization 
may be granted only if there are exceptional reasons for the abortion. 
   Permits under the first paragraph may not be granted if there is 
reason to assume that the foetus is viable. 
(…) 
5 § Only those who are authorized to practice medicine may perform 
abortion or termination of pregnancy according to § 6. 
   Abortion or termination of pregnancy under § 6 shall be carried out 
in a public hospital or other medical institution which is approved by 
the National Board of Health and Welfare. Act (2007:998). 
6 § If it can be assumed that the pregnancy presents a serious risk to 
the woman’s life or health, because of illness or a physical defect of 
the woman, the National Board of Health and Welfare may grant 
permission for termination of pregnancy after the end of the 
eighteenth week of pregnancy, and irrespective of how far the 
pregnancy has progressed. 
   If termination of pregnancy because of illness or physical defect in 
the woman cannot be postponed without endangering the woman, the 
action may be performed, notwithstanding the provisions of the first 
paragraph and § 5 second paragraph. Act (2007:998).[…]137 
 
The Swedish Abortion Act allows for abortion of the foetus up until the 
eighteenth week, on the demand of the woman. After week eighteen an 
application must be made to the National Board of Health and Welfare, 
which decides on a case by case basis. This usually means that abortion is 
allowed up until week twenty-two, but if the foetus is not compatible with 
life then an abortion can be obtained at any point in the gestation.
138
 Neither 
is there a time limit for abortion if the woman’s life is in danger (cf. 6§ of 
the 1975 Abortion Act).  
 
As the number of legally induced abortions in Sweden increased, there was 
a reduction of those illegally performed. With the 1975 Act, illegal abortion 
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ceased to exist in Sweden.
139
 Sweden has one of the most liberal abortion 
legislations in Europe.
140
 There is hardly any discussion in Sweden today as 
to the existence of the liberal abortion right in Sweden. The right-wing 
conservative party Sverigedemokraterna [the Sweden Democrats] has 
recently aimed to make the discussion more varied by re-introducing a more 
restrictive approach.
141
 
 
In a comparison with Ireland and Poland, it is interesting to note that 
Sweden is one of the most secularized countries in the world.
142
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5 Abortion and Gender Equality 
in the Council of Europe 
In the previous chapter the national legislations on abortion within three 
Member States of the Council of Europe was presented. In this chapter, the 
policy decisions in the form of resolutions, recommendations and 
declarations that have been adopted in the Council of Europe on the issues 
of gender equality, abortion and reproductive rights are studied. The 
methodology in this chapter is a legal dogmatic one. In regard to the gender 
equality documents I am more limited in terms of time and space 
constraints. Overall, the gender equality debate within the Council of 
Europe is very interesting, and could easily be made into a master thesis on 
its own. An overview of the development of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in regard to abortion is given and the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation is presented. This chapter serves to give an overview of how 
the debate on abortion and gender equality has developed in the Council of 
Europe.  
 
The next chapter presents the cases from the European Court of Human 
Rights in regard to abortion. In chapter 7 the policy decisions of the Council 
of Europe and the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights will 
be used to form a coherent analysis of to what extent the right to abortion is 
protected in the Council of Europe System. 
 
5.1 Policy Decisions of the Council of 
Europe on Gender Equality 
First off, to understand the abortion debate within the Council of Europe, 
the Council’s stance on gender equality must be studied. Liberal abortion 
policy and legislation is in itself an expression of a more gender equal 
society, because in a society where a woman can decide over her own body 
and make her own reproductive choices, she is more likely to have deciding 
power in both the private and the public sphere (cf. supra, chapter 2). The 
Council of Europe is working to further the cause of gender equality, 
although a lot of work still remains. The Directorate General of Human 
Rights and Rule of Law define gender equality as the following: 
 
Gender equality means an equal visibility, empowerment, 
responsibility and participation of both sexes in all spheres of public 
and private life. Gender equality is the opposite of gender inequality, 
not of gender difference.
143
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In 1988 the Committee of Ministers adopted the declaration of equality 
between men and women
144
, in which it was stated that equality of women 
and men is a principle of human rights, upheld as a fundamental right in 
many international instruments.
145
 The Committee stressed the importance 
of the aspirations, interests and talents of both sexes being included for the 
betterment and progress of humanity, and observed that both legal and 
factual inequalities persist to exist between men and women in present-day 
society.
146
 The purpose was that resolute overall policies should be pursued 
for the effective achievement of equality between women and men, and that 
these policies should involve authorities, groups and individuals. The 
Committee of Ministers even goes so far as to say that without equality 
between men and women, there cannot be democracy and social justice is a 
fallacy.
147
 
 
Four years later, in 1992, the Parliamentary Assembly tabled a written 
declaration
148
 on the protection of women's life, dignity and rights, stating 
that equality in the sphere of private life implies the recognition of freedom 
of choice and the right to self-determination as regards procreation, for both 
men and women.
149
 The declaration made a point of that the free choice for 
women of motherhood is an established fact in democratic societies and that 
this should include, inter alia, the voluntary interruption of pregnancy.
150
 
The great majority of the Member States of the Council of Europe have 
enacted liberal legislations in the field which are respectful of women's life, 
dignity and rights.
151
  
 
A written declaration of the Parliamentary Assembly does not commit the 
Assembly to the content.
152
 The Parliamentary Assembly is strictly an 
investigative, advisory body of the Council of Europe. A recommendation is 
the Assembly’s proposal addressed to the Committee of Ministers, for 
implementation by them or the governments of the Member States.
153
  
 
In 1994 the Parliamentary Assembly adopted recommendation 1229 on 
equality of rights between men and women
154
. The Parliamentary Assembly 
stressed that the fundamental rights of women and girls are an inalienable, 
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integral and indivisible part of universal human rights.
155
 The Parliamentary 
Assembly went on to state its conviction that greater participation by 
women in all levels of political life would entail a fuller understanding and 
perception of all the issues facing a modern democratic society.
156
 The 
Assembly recommended the Committee of Ministers to pursue and 
strengthen its work on equality of rights between women and men, putting 
particular emphasis on the equal participation of men and women in 
political life and the decision-making process, and be mindful to also apply 
this to the representative organs of the Council of Europe.
157
 
 
The Committee of Ministers replied
158
 to Recommendation 1229 (1994). It 
affirmed the fact that equality between men and women is a prioritized 
political issue in Europe and agreed with the Parliamentary Assembly that a 
contemporary “genuine” democracy needs to have the full participation of 
women, on an equal footing with men, or it is not functional.
159
 The 
Committee went on to state that there is a generally recognized gap in 
contemporary legal and political doctrine between the equality in law, and 
the situation de facto for women.
160
 In answer to the specific points of 
criticism of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers 
declared that it was prepared to do its utmost to step up its work on equality 
between women and men, notably in regard to the equal participation in 
political life and the decision-making process.
161
  
 
In 2003 the Committee of Ministers adopted the recommendation to 
Member States on balanced participation of women and men in political and 
public decision making
162
. The governments of the Member States were 
recommended to commit themselves to promote a balanced representation 
of women and men. The governments should do this by recognizing 
publicly that when men and women of different ages and backgrounds are 
equally participating in the decision-making democracy is strengthened and 
enriched.
163
 Among other measures, governments should stimulate and 
support women’s will to take part in political and public decision making.164 
The governments should monitor and evaluate the progress in this field, and 
report this and the measures taken regularly to the Committee of 
Ministers.
165
 A recommendation from the Committee of Ministers to a 
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Member State is made under article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of 
Europe, and it is not binding.
166
 
 
In 2009 the Committee of Ministers issued a declaration on making gender 
equality a reality
167
, which reviewed the progress in the twenty years since 
the Declaration on equality of women and men and called for further action. 
The Committee of Ministers noted that even though the legal status of 
women has improved over time, there is still a lot to be done, de jure and de 
facto.
168
 The declaration drew attention to the underrepresentation of women 
in political and public life, highlighting and deprecating the gender-based 
discrimination against women that is continually a part of women’s lives, at 
all ages and in all sectors of society. It emphasised that a genuine democracy 
must fully use the competences, the skills and the creativity of both women 
and men in order to build a society with a better quality of life for all.
169
 The 
Committee continued to urge governments and parliaments of Member 
States to integrate a gender equality perspective in governance in order to 
achieve full gender equality.
170
 One of the ways in which to achieve this, 
according to the Committee of Ministers, is to take the necessary measures 
to guarantee an equal sharing of responsibilities between women and men in 
private and family life and to create conditions favourable to the 
reconciliation of private and family life with professional life. It is important 
to take into account the different situations in women’s and men’s lives, the 
Committee of Ministers emphasized. Finally, the Committee pointed to the 
importance of encouraging men to participate actively in the discussions and 
activities aimed at achieving gender equality in all spheres of life.
 171
  
 
In the Charter of the United Nations, the non-discrimination between men 
and women is stated in the first paragraph of the preamble: 
 
[We the Peoples of the United Nations] reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women […] 
 
The Statute of the Council of Europe and the European Convention for 
Human Rights both lack this policy statement in their respective 
preambles.
172
 However, the European Court of Human Rights frequently 
applies the evolutive theory of interpretation, which places a great emphasis 
on contemporary, cultural and sociological notions, inter alia gender 
equality.
173
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5.2 Policy Decisions of the Council of 
Europe on Abortion 
Already in 1972, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted a recommendation on 
birth control and family planning in Council of Europe Member States
174
. It 
considered that the last fifty years of socio-cultural changes in Western 
European societies meant that couples were claiming the right to decide the 
number and spacing of their children. The Parliamentary Assembly 
criticized the use of abortion and advocated other forms of contraception, 
hoping that promotion of alternative methods of family planning would 
decrease the number of abortions.
175
  
 
By the 1990s, the Parliamentary Assembly made it clear that women need 
access to contraceptives, abortion and information and education thereof. It 
is needed for their reproductive rights to be effective and for equality to be 
achieved between men and women, as the 1992 written declaration on the 
protection of women's life, dignity and rights (cf. supra) attested to. 
 
In 2003, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted the resolution 1347 (2003) on 
the impact of the “Mexico City Policy” on the free choice of contraception 
in Europe
176
, in which it stated: 
 
In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family 
planning. But in circumstances where abortion is not against the law, 
such abortion should be safe and accessible. This both avoids the 
health complications (and deaths) arising from unsafe abortions and 
allows family planning counsellors direct access to women who have 
recently undergone an abortion in order to help them avoid another 
unwanted pregnancy.
177
 
 
In 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted two resolutions on the topic 
of reproductive health. It was both a plan on how to involve men in 
reproductive rights, and a strategy for the promotion of sexual and 
reproductive rights. 
 
Resolution 1394 (2004) on the involvement of men, especially young men, 
in reproductive health
178
 highlighted that traditionally issues of reproductive 
health have been considered “women’s issues”. Because it is women that are 
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the ones who become pregnant, regularly women have been made to deal 
alone with the potential consequences of being sexually active.
179
  
 
Resolution 1399 (2004) on the European strategy for the promotion of 
sexual and reproductive health and rights
180
 stated that every individual has 
the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health, which 
is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being
181
. To achieve 
reproductive health people must be able to avoid inter alia unwanted 
pregnancies. Individuals and couples should be able to regulate their fertility 
without adverse or dangerous consequences.
182
 A large number of Member 
States have very high standards of sexual and reproductive health, and the 
Parliamentary Assembly recommended that their experiences should serve 
as useful examples to other Member States in finding solutions to improve 
the sexual and reproductive health situation in their own countries. The 
Parliamentary Assembly also drew attention to the enormous disparity of 
standards between Member States, such as in the case of poor access, 
availability and affordability of sexual and reproductive health commodities 
and services, or even a lack of use thereof in Member States with a lower 
standard on sexual and reproductive health. It condemned the need in some 
Member States for illegal, backstreet and unsafe abortions. The 
Parliamentary Assembly called upon Member States to work together to 
design a European strategy for the promotion of sexual and reproductive 
health and rights, and prepare, adopt and implement comprehensive national 
strategies for sexual and reproductive health that would address inter alia 
reproductive health information and education, the high abortion rates (and 
the unsafe abortions in the Member States where abortion is illegal), and the 
lack of affordable, accessible and available sexual and reproductive health 
commodities and services.  
 
Following resolution 1399 (2004), the Assembly adopted the text of 
recommendation 1675 (2004) on a European strategy for the promotion of 
sexual and reproductive health and rights
183
. It recommended the Committee 
of Ministers to design a comprehensive European strategy for the promotion 
of sexual and reproductive health and rights
184
, to promote an exchange of 
experiences between Member States on successful national sexual and 
reproductive health approaches and to promote a dialogue on sexual and 
reproductive health rights in public health policy.
185
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In 2006, parliamentarian Christina Hägg presented the motion for resolution 
on abortion and its impact on women and girls in Europe
186
. It focused on 
the fact that although abortion is legal (to various extent) in the majority of 
the Member States, women are still being denied abortions when they come 
to the hospital.
187
 The motion called for the Member States of the Council of 
Europe to ensure that in the countries where abortion is legal, access to safe, 
acceptable, high-quality, affordable abortion services, and a full range of 
modern contraception, is within the reach of every woman within her 
community, with a particular focus on those women living outside urban 
areas. It is of fundamental value that women across Europe have the 
possibility to exercise their legal rights and not to be discriminated 
against.
188
  
 
In the report
189
 from the Commission on Equal Opportunities for Women 
and Men following the motion, the Assembly was urged to take the stance 
pro-abortion. The Commission pointed out that a ban on abortion does not 
lead to fewer abortions, but to a higher number of illegal, unsafe, 
clandestine abortions, which are more traumatic and are more dangerous 
than legal abortions. The report also suggested that the Parliamentary 
Assembly should invite the governments of the Member States to guarantee 
women’s effective exercise of their right to abortion. This entails lifting 
restrictions which hinder, de jure or de facto, access to safe abortion.
190
  
 
Following the report the Parliamentary Assembly adopted resolution 1607 
(2008) on access to safe and legal abortion in Europe
191
. The Assembly took 
the view that: 
 
A ban on abortions does not result in fewer abortions but mainly leads 
to clandestine abortions, which are more traumatic and increase 
maternal mortality and/or lead to abortion “tourism” which is costly, 
and delays the timing of an abortion and results in social inequities. 
The lawfulness of abortion does not have an effect on a woman’s need 
for an abortion, but only on her access to a safe abortion.
192
 
 
While the Parliamentary Assembly did condemn the use of abortion as a 
family planning method
193
, it voiced its concern that in many Member 
States numerous conditions were imposed that restrict the effective access to 
safe, affordable, acceptable and appropriate abortion services. The 
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Assembly pointed out that these restrictions have discriminatory effects, 
since women who are well informed and possess adequate financial means 
can often obtain legal and safe abortions more easily. The Assembly also 
noted that, in Member States where abortion is permitted, the conditions are 
not always such as to guarantee women effective access to this right
194
 (cf. 
infra, Tysiac v. Poland, R.R. v. Poland and P. and S. v. Poland). Whether 
the hinders are a lack of local health care facilities, the lack of doctors 
willing to carry out abortions, the repeated medical consultations required, 
the time allowed for changing one’s mind or the waiting time for the 
abortion, they all lead to a difficulty, or even practically impossibility, of 
accessing safe, affordable, acceptable and appropriate abortion services. The 
Assembly affirmed: 
 
[…] the right of all human beings, in particular women, to respect for 
their physical integrity and to freedom to control their own bodies. In 
this context, the ultimate decision on whether or not to have an 
abortion should be a matter for the woman concerned, who should 
have the means of exercising this right in an effective way.
195
 
 
The Parliamentary Assembly invited the Member States of the Council of 
Europe to decriminalize abortion within reasonable gestational limits and to 
guarantee women’s effective exercise of their right to access to a safe and 
legal abortion, both de jure and de facto. Further it recommended the 
Member States to allow women freedom of choice and to offer the 
conditions for a free and enlightened choice without specifically promoting 
abortion, and to ensure that women and men have access to contraception 
and advice on contraception at a reasonable cost. Non-judgmental sex 
information and education should also be made available. For women 
wanting an abortion because of family or financial pressure, counselling and 
practical support should be provided.
196
  
 
In January 2013, Parliamentary Assembly member Mr Luca Volontè of Italy 
posed a written question
197
 to the Committee of Ministers, wherein he asked 
how a country could be pressure to legalise abortion in the name of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which “does not enshrine a right to 
abortion”198. Mr Volontè also asked why the Committee of Ministers 
decided to give precedence to the case of A, B and C v. Ireland, when “so 
many important cases of violations of human rights guaranteed by the 
Convention are treated under the ordinary procedure”199.  
 
Mr Volontè stated that according to the European Court of Human Rights 
no right to abortion is contained within the European Convention, and that 
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prenatal life is not in principle excluded from the scope of protection of the 
Convention. It is, according to Mr Volontè, within each Member State’s 
margin of appreciation to decide when life begins. Mr Volontè criticizes 
what he believes to be the abuse of Convention system to impose an 
obligation upon Ireland that is contrary to the original intention of the 
drafters of the Convention.
200
 
 
5.3 The Development of the Right to 
Abortion Within the European Court of 
Human Rights 
The European Convention on Human Rights is the primary human rights 
instrument in Europe. The question of if, and if so to what extent, the 
Convention guarantee access to safe and legal abortion has been left open by 
the Strasbourg organs. The case of Brüggemann and Scheuten v. the FRG
201
 
was the first case to directly confront access to abortion as a right to privacy, 
under article 8. The Commission came to the conclusion that not every 
termination of pregnancy could be said to be a matter solely about the right 
to life of the mother because the life of the developing foetus is closely 
connected to the life of the mother.
202
 In the report of the Commission, the 
three Nordic members wrote in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Opsahl: 
 
And we take the view, personally, that laws regulating abortion ought 
to leave the decision to have it performed in the early stage of 
pregnancy to the woman concerned. […]'Fristenlosung' based on self- 
determination-- is the one most consistent with what we think a right 
to respect for private life in this context ought to mean in our time.
203
 
 
In H v. Norway
204
, this view was upheld by the Commission. Abortion on 
social grounds in the fourteenth week of gestation was not contrary to the 
Convention. The cases that have reached the Court on the question of 
abortion are complaints of violation of the article 8 right of the applicants to 
self-determination in regard to procreation matters.
205
  
 
In the next chapter, five cases of great importance for the development on 
the doctrine on abortion within the Council of Europe are presented. 
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5.4 Margin of Appreciation – Different 
States, Different Standards 
The margin of appreciation, although it is surrounded by a multitude of 
jurisprudence, is striking in its “casuistic, uneven, and largely unpredictable 
nature”206. The term refers to the scope of freedom of action governments 
enjoys in deciding how to fulfil their obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
207
 When the Convention was adopted in 
1950 it was supposed to be the lowest common denominator for the 
Contracting States, a minimum standard of fundamental rights. For the 
Contracting States to defer sovereignty and to adhere to common standards 
of human rights was, and continues to be, difficult because of different 
cultural and legal traditions. The Convention is understood to be 
complementary to national systems, but ultimately subsidiary, which means 
that the enforcement of the Strasbourg organs ultimately depend on the good 
faith and cooperation of the Contracting States. In order to strike a balance 
between the uniform application of the Convention and the differing 
national views of human rights, the margin of appreciation has thus been 
developed.
208
 In the case Handyside v. the UK
209
 the European Court of 
Human Rights stated that: 
 
[…]it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various 
Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals. The 
view taken by their respective laws of the requirements of morals 
varies from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era 
which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of 
opinions on the subject. By reason of their direct and continuous 
contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in 
principle in a better position than the international judge to give an 
opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the 
"necessity" of a "restriction" or "penalty" intended to meet them.
210
 
 
The Court noted that the national authorities were in principle in a better 
position to assess if there is a “pressing social need”, and if this need 
justifies the interference of rights in the interest of “public morals”, thus 
whether a measure is “necessary in a democratic society” or not.211 
According to Greer, the margin of appreciation cannot be said to have a 
wider scope than article 15 of the Convention, from which it stems. This 
means that the margin of appreciation is not applicable to non-derogable 
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rights, such as the right to life and the prohibition of torture.
212
 According to 
Arai-Takahashi the “clawback” clauses in articles 8 to 11 of the Convention 
which prescribe that an interference must be “necessary in a democratic 
society” presented the prototype for the margin of appreciation that made 
the judgment in Handyside v. the UK significant. 
 
The application of the doctrine has been extended over time. National 
authorities have a margin of appreciation in evaluating whether a fair 
balance has been struck between the interest of society as a whole, and the 
rights of the individual. In repeatedly emphasizing the scope of the 
Contracting States’ sovereignty and the doctrine as an exercise of balancing 
rights, the Strasbourg organs have justified the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation for all Convention rights but four; the right to life, the 
prohibition of torture, the prohibition of slavery and forced labour and 
freedom from ex past facto laws.
213
 In matters of morality the European 
Court on Human Rights has often allowed the Member States a wide margin 
of appreciation without for that matter letting it prevent the Court from 
scrutinizing and materially reconsidering decisions made by the domestic 
court (cf. Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, chapter 6.1).
214
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6 Cases Regarding the Right to 
Abortion from the European 
Court of Human Rights 
In the previous chapter, the policy decisions of the Council of Europe on the 
issues of gender equality, abortion and reproductive rights were studied. In 
this chapter, the main cases on abortion in the European Court of Human 
Rights are presented. It is no coincidence that out of the five cases presented 
in the thesis, only two countries are represented; Ireland and Poland. Apart 
from Malta, they represent some of the most restrictive abortion legislations 
in the Member States of the Council of Europe. The cases are presented 
chronologically for the best overview of the Court’s development of its 
policy on abortion. The cases pertain both to the freedom of and the right to 
respect for private life in regard to abortion. In this chapter I use the legal 
dogmatic method to study and present the cases. 
 
In the next chapter, the cases are discussed and analysed in the context of 
the Council of Europe with regard to the margin of appreciation, States’ 
sovereignty and the feminist theories of law, reproductive rights and gender 
inequality presented in chapter 2.  
 
6.1 The Freedom of Expression in Regard 
to Abortion – Open Door and Dublin 
Well Woman v. Ireland 
The case of Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland
215
centre around 
two companies, the Open Door Counselling Ltd [hereafter Open Door] and 
Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd [hereafter Dublin Well Woman] together 
with three Irish citizens, Ms Downes, Mrs X, and Ms Geraghty, and one 
U.S. citizen, Ms Maher. Ms Downes and Ms Maher were both employed by 
Dublin Well Woman as trained counsellors, and Mrs X and Ms Geraghty 
joined the application as women of child-bearing age.  
 
Both Open Door and Dublin Well Woman were non-profit-making 
organizations
216
 that provided a broad range of services relating to 
counselling and marriage, family planning, procreation and health matters. 
Among their wide range of services relating to women’s health, it was 
agreed in the Supreme Court of Ireland that the organizations counselled 
pregnant women in a non-directive manner, in which abortion and 
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termination of pregnancy sometimes were discussed. If the pregnant woman 
wanted to consider the option of abortion, the organizations arranged for a 
referral to a medical clinic in Great Britain, where women had then obtained 
abortions. Dublin Well Woman also helped arrange the travel for pregnant 
women to these medical clinics, in certain circumstances. 
 
In the national High Court, and later in the Irish Supreme Court, an 
injunction was made against the applicants, wherein the applicants and their 
servants or agents were “perpetually restrained from assisting pregnant 
women within the jurisdiction to travel abroad to obtain abortions by 
referral to a clinic, by the making for them of travel arrangements, or by 
informing them of the identity and location of and the method of 
communication with a specified clinic or clinics or otherwise”217. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights found, by fifteen votes to eight, that 
there had been a violation of article 10 freedom of expression of the 
Convention. The injunction interfered with the corporate applicants’ right to 
impart information, and there could be no doubt that the applicant 
counsellors’ right to impart information was interfered with as well. There 
was also an interference with the right to receive information, in the case of 
Mrs X and Ms Geraghty, should they become pregnant.
218
 Although the 
Court could not accept the restriction upon the freedom of expression to be 
pursued in the aim of the prevention of crime, it did find that the restriction 
pursued a legitimate aim under article 10.2 of the Convention.
219
 The 1983 
referendum was used to show the stance of the majority of the Irish 
population on this issue of morality. Further, the Court found that the 
restriction of the freedom of expression was prescribed by law.
220
 However, 
the Court found that the restriction placed on the applicants was 
disproportionate to the aims pursued, and concluded that there had been a 
breach of article 10.
221
  
 
6.2 The Right to Private Life in Regard to 
Abortion 
In Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, the Court answered to 
what extent abortion was protected under the Convention in regard to the 
freedom of expression. In the following four cases, the Court answered to 
what extent abortion is protected under the article 8 right to private life. 
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6.2.1 Tysiąc v. Poland 
The applicant in the 2007 case
222
, Ms Tysiąc, suffered from severe myopia. 
She already had two children when she became pregnant again in early 
2000. The applicant was worried about her condition and sought the 
consultation of her doctors. Even though all three doctors concluded that 
due to pathological changes in her retina both the pregnancy and the 
delivery constituted a risk to her eyesight, they all refused to issue a 
certificate for the pregnancy to be terminated. Not only was her eye-sight at 
risk, but she also were at risk of her uterus rapturing, due to her two 
previous Caesarean sections. A general practitioner issued a certificate to 
this effect. In the second month of her pregnancy, the applicant’s eye sight 
was determined to have deteriorated and the applicant contacted the State 
hospital in Warsaw to have her pregnancy terminated. When she arrived, the 
Head of the Gynaecology and Obstetrics Department of the clinic examined 
the applicant visually for no more than five minutes. He then made a note on 
the back of her certificate that her condition did not constitute grounds for 
an abortion. Consequently, the applicant gave birth to a child in November 
2000. After the birth, the applicant’s eye sight worsened seriously and 
approximately six weeks after the delivery she was taken to the emergency 
ophthalmological clinic in Warsaw. She faces the risk of going blind.  
 
The Court found that there had been a violation of article 8 of the 
Convention in that the State failed to comply with its positive obligations to 
secure to the applicant the effective respect for her private life. The Polish 
abortion legislation does allow for abortion on grounds that the woman’s 
health or life is in danger (cf. supra, the 1993 Act in chapter 4.2), and so the 
Court did not find it to be their task to examine whether abortion is a right 
guaranteed under the Convention.
223
 The Court referred to Brüggemann and 
Scheuten and repeated that legislation on the matter of interrupting 
pregnancy touches upon the sphere of private life “since whenever a woman 
is pregnant her private life becomes closely connected with the developing 
foetus”224. The Court reiterated that aspects of an individual’s physical and 
social identity, including her right to personal autonomy and development, 
are encompassed, among other things, in the broad meaning of “private 
life”. The right to private life means that the State has a positive obligation 
to secure to its citizens their right to effective respect for their physical and 
psychological integrity. Privacy and public interest are balanced in a State’s 
regulation of abortion, but in the case of therapeutic abortion, the physical 
integrity of a pregnant woman must be included in the assessment of the 
State’s positive obligation to secure it.225 In both the negative and the 
positive context of a State’s obligations under article 8, a fair balance has to 
be struck between the individual and the community.
226
 This is where the 
State’s margin of appreciation comes in. The rule of law is a fundamental 
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principle of a democratic society, and in order for a State to comply with its 
requisites, it is presupposed that the rules of domestic law provide a measure 
of legal protection for the rights in the Convention against the arbitrary 
interference by public authorities.
227
 It is of fundamental importance that the 
rights safeguarded in the Convention are not theoretical or illusory, but 
practical and effective.
228
 
 
6.2.2 A, B and C v. Ireland 
In the 2010 Grand Chamber case of A, B and C v. Ireland
229
, the applicants 
complained under article 8 of the Convention. Applicants A and B were 
Irish nationals, and applicant C was Lithuanian. The first two applicants 
complained that their article 8 right to respect for private and family life was 
violated, primarily because of the prohibition of abortion for health and 
well-being reasons in Ireland. The third applicant’s main complaint was 
under the same article, for the alleged failure to implement the constitutional 
right to an abortion in Ireland in the case of a risk to the life of the woman.  
 
Applicant A became unintentionally pregnant, and travelled to England in 
February 2005 for an abortion. She did not believe she was entitled to an 
abortion in Ireland. She already had four children, all of them in foster care 
because of her alcoholism. During all of her pregnancies she had suffered 
from depression. Before her unintentional pregnancy she had been sober for 
a year, and hoped to regain custody of her children. One more child put her 
health and the reunification of her family in jeopardy, which is why she 
decided to travel to England for an abortion. She had to borrow the money 
for travel expenses and procedures. In order to make it back to Ireland in 
time for a meeting with her youngest child, she travelled to Ireland the day 
after the abortion. When she began bleeding profusely on the train, an 
ambulance was called for. For weeks the applicant experienced pain, nausea 
and bleeding, but she did not seek further medical advice.  
 
The second applicant, B, travelled to England in January 2005 to obtain an 
abortion she did not believe she was entitled to in Ireland. The pregnancy 
was unintended after the failure of emergency contraception. She was 
advised by two doctors that there was a substantial risk that the pregnancy 
was an ectopic pregnancy. Apart from the risk to her health, the applicant 
was not in a position to care for a child at this time of her life. She had to 
borrow money to travel to England in secret. When the applicant returned to 
Ireland, she started passing blood clots. After two weeks she sought follow-
up care at a clinic in Dublin that was affiliated to the English clinic. 
 
In March 2005 the third applicant, C, had an abortion in England. She did so 
believing that she could not establish her right to an abortion in Ireland. At 
the time, she had been treated for three years with chemotherapy for a rare 
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form of cancer. According to her doctor, it was not possible to predict the 
effect of the pregnancy on the cancer, and if she had chemotherapy in the 
first trimester it would be dangerous for the foetus. When she 
unintentionally became pregnant she did not know of it until after she had 
gone through a number of tests for cancer. The applicant consulted her 
general practitioner and several other medical consultants, but she believed 
she received insufficient information as to the impact of the pregnancy on 
her health and life and of the effect the tests would have on the foetus, due 
to the chilling effect of the Irish legal framework. When she returned to 
Ireland after the abortion, the applicant suffered prolonged bleeding and 
infection, due to the abortion being incomplete. The applicant alleged that 
the doctors provided inadequate medical care. 
 
All three applicants complained under articles 3, 8, 13, and 14 of the 
Convention. The third applicant, C, also complained under the article 2 right 
to life. C complained about the absence of legislative implementation of 
article 40.3.3 of the Convention. Without the legislative implementation, she 
argued there was no appropriate means of establishing her right to, on 
grounds of the risk to her life, a lawful abortion in Ireland. Applicants A and 
B complained about the prohibition of abortion in Ireland on ground of 
health and well-being.  
 
The Court found that there had been a violation of article 8 in regard to the 
third applicant, C. The Court recalled that within the meaning of article 8 of 
the Convention, the notion of “private life” is a broad concept. It 
encompasses, inter alia, the right to personal autonomy and the right to 
personal development. It concerns, among other subjects, a person’s 
physical and psychological integrity and the decision whether or not to have 
a child. Citing inter alia Tysiąc v. Poland, the Court reiterated that 
legislation regulating the interruption of pregnancy touches upon the sphere 
of the private life of the woman, and although article 8 cannot be interpreted 
as conferring a right to abortion, pregnancy and the termination of 
pregnancy pertain uniquely to the woman’s private life:230  
 
When a woman is pregnant, her private life becomes closely 
connected with the developing foetus. The woman’s right to respect 
for her private life must be weighed against other competing rights 
and freedoms including those of the unborn child.
231
 
 
The Court concluded that by the absence of any implementing legislative or 
regulatory regime providing accessible and effective procedure for 
establishing whether or not a woman qualifies for a lawful abortion in 
Ireland in accordance with article 40.3.3 of the Constitution, the Irish 
authorities failed to comply with their positive obligation under article 8 to 
secure for the third applicant effective respect of her private life.
232
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In regard to the first and the second applicant, although the Court did not 
find any violation to their rights under the Convention, it discussed the 
prohibition in Ireland of abortion on the ground of health and well-being. It 
found that the prohibition of termination of pregnancy for health or well-
being reasons constituted an interference with the first and second 
applicants’ right to private life in the wide interpretation of the term. 
However, the interference was found to be justified under the second 
paragraph of article 8, fulfilling the requirements of being in accordance 
with the law, and being necessary in a democratic society for legitimate 
aims specified in the article.
233
 These are: 
 
[…] national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.
234
 
 
The Court found that the national legal provisions on the prohibition of 
abortion were clearly accessible, and it was clearly foreseeable that the first 
and second applicants were not entitled to an abortion under Irish law. As to 
the legitimate aim of the interference, the Court referred to Open Door and 
Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland and the 1983 Irish referendum on the stance 
of the majority of the Irish people on abortion. The applicants maintained 
that the will of the Irish public had changed since the 1983 referendum. The 
Court, however, did not see that the changes in Irish law (cf. supra, chapter 
4.1 on the rejection of restrictive amendments to the Constitution and the 
adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution) 
demonstrated a relevant change of public opinion.
235
 Referring inter alia to 
cases Handyside v. the UK and Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. 
Ireland, the Court reiterated that State authorities are in principle in a better 
position to give an opinion on the content of the requirements of morals in 
their State, and the necessity of a restriction intended to meet them. The 
international judge is too far removed from the issue, and in this case the 
State’s opinion on the matter should not be displaced, as the applicants did 
not show sufficiently indicative evidence of a change of the public mind.
236
 
 
As to the necessity in a democratic society, the Court looked to the 
existence of a pressing social need and if the interference was proportionate 
to the legitimate aim pursued. A fair balance has to be struck between the 
competing interests of the applicants’ right to private life and the profound 
moral values of the Irish people. In this respect the State enjoy a margin of 
appreciation. In determining the breadth of the margin of appreciation the 
State enjoy when determining any case under article 8, there is a number of 
factors to take into account. This margin will be restricted when a 
particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at 
stake. However, in cases where there is no consensus between the Member 
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States of the Convention as to either the relative importance of the interest at 
stake or the best way to protect it, the margin of appreciation is wider, 
especially in cases of sensitive moral or ethical issues. The Court pressed 
upon that there could be no doubt of the acute sensitivity of the moral and 
ethical questions raised by abortion, or of the importance of the public 
interest at stake. Therefore, it was within Ireland’s margin of appreciation to 
determine the question of whether a fair balance was struck between the 
protection of the public interest and the conflicting interest of the applicants’ 
right to private life under the Convention. Even though there is a consensus 
on allowing abortion on broader grounds than allowed under Irish law 
amongst a substantial majority of the Contracting States, the Court did not 
consider this to decisively narrow the broad margin of appreciation of 
Ireland.
237
 
 
Because applicants A and B still had the option of travelling abroad for an 
abortion (as per the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Irish 
Constitution) and this information was freely available to them (following 
Ireland’s compliance with the Court’s decision in Open Door and Dublin 
Well Woman v. Ireland), and because their access to appropriate medical 
care in Ireland, the Irish prohibition of abortion on health and welfare 
grounds did not exceed the margin of appreciation accorded to the State.
238
 
The Court concluded that in respect to the two first applicants there was no 
violation of article 8 of the Convention.  
 
6.2.3 R.R. v. Poland 
In the case of R.R. v. Poland
239
 the 29-year-old applicant wanted an abortion 
because she suspected that the foetus was affected with a malformation. At 
this point in time the applicant was married and had two children. An 
ultrasound in the eighteenth week of her pregnancy (20 February 2002) 
showed signs that the foetus could be suffering from malformation. The 
applicant made it clear that she wished to have an abortion if the suspicion 
proved to be true. From this point, the applicant was sent between hospitals 
and ultra sounds, each confirming a likely foetal malformation. In spite of 
this, her doctor refused to make the referral for a genetic examination by 
means of amniocentesis. The ultrasound could not be treated as the sole 
ground for a termination of pregnancy, and the applicant was refused a 
genetic examination until the twenty-third week of gestation, with a waiting 
time of two weeks for the results. The applicant requested a termination in 
writing on the 29
th
 of March and on April 3
rd
 she had a scheduled meeting 
with a consultant, which, when she arrived at the hospital, was rescheduled 
to a week later. On April 9
th
 the applicant requested a termination of her 
pregnancy again, this time referring to the result of the genetic tests which 
she received that very same day. The presence of Turner syndrome in the 
foetus was confirmed by the results of the genetic test. By this time the 
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doctors refused to carry out the termination because it was too late in the 
pregnancy; the foetus was able to survive outside the mother’s body. The 
applicant gave birth in July 2002 to a girl with Turner syndrome.  
 
The Court found that there had been a violation of articles 3 and 8 of the 
Convention. For the relevancy of this thesis, the violation of article 8 is of 
interest. 
 
Reiterating that private life is a broad concept, and that the notion of private 
life also applies to the decision whether or not to have a child, the Court 
stated that the decision of a woman to continue her pregnancy or not falls 
squarely in the sphere of private life. Therefore, legislation regulating the 
interruption of pregnancy touches upon the sphere of private life.
240
 The 
protection of the individual against the arbitrary interference by public 
authorities is the essential object of article 8. Any interference with the right 
to private life must be justified by the terms in the second paragraph of the 
article (cf. supra A, B and C v. Ireland for a comprehensive discussion on 
the matter, and also Tysiąc v. Poland). Furthermore, the Court noted, in the 
positive obligation of the State to respect the right to private life there is a 
right to the effective respect for its citizens’ physical and psychological 
integrity. As shown in Tysiąc v. Poland and A, B and C v. Ireland, this 
includes the protection of individual’s rights and the implementation of 
specific measures in the context of abortion.
241
  
 
The Court again held that the issue of when life begins should be left to each 
State’s margin of appreciation, although it referred to the evolutive 
interpretation of the Convention. The evolutive interpretation of the 
Convention reflects that the Convention is a “living instrument which must 
be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”242. The reason for the 
Court taking the position that this issue is within the State’s margin of 
appreciation is that it has not yet been resolved within the majority of the 
Contracting States. There is no European consensus on the definition, 
legally or scientifically, of when life begins. However, there is a substantial 
majority consensus among the Contracting States on allowing abortion. In 
accordance with the approach in A, B, and C v. Ireland, the Court stated that 
it was for the State to balance the conflicting rights of the mother and the 
unborn.
243
 In the context of the negative obligation of the State to respect 
the individual’s right to private life, once the decision is made for under 
which circumstance abortion is permitted in the State, the legal framework 
should reflect this in a coherent manner, adequately weighing the conflicting 
interests and in accordance with the Convention (cf. supra A, B and C v. 
Ireland). A fair balance has to be struck between the competing interests of 
the individual and the community in both the context of positive or negative 
obligations. The rights guaranteed by the Convention are not supposed to be 
theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective, and there must be legal 
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protection against arbitrary interferences by public authorities provided in 
the domestic law, or the rule of law is undermined.
244
 Reiterating its 
findings in Tysiąc v. Poland, the Court stated that a State has a positive 
obligation to create a procedural framework that enables a woman to 
exercise her right of access to a lawful abortion, if that State has adopted 
legislation allowing abortions, acting within the limits of its margin of 
appreciation.
245
  
 
6.2.4 P. and S. v. Poland 
In P. and S. v. Poland
246
, a mother and a daughter were the applicants. The 
first applicant, a 14-year-old girl had become pregnant as a result of a rape 
in early April 2008. Together the applicants decided that an abortion was the 
best choice for the girl. The District Prosecutor issued a certificate stating 
that the pregnancy was the result of unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
minor under 15 years of age. In their pursuit of a referral to obtain an 
abortion, they were met by the opposition of medical practitioners, religious 
leaders, anti-abortion protesters and even the police. The hospital staff at the 
hospital where the first applicant tried to obtain an abortion attempted to 
convince her of continuing her pregnancy, despite her own wishes and her 
young age. The hospital leaked the sensitive information about her to the 
press, and she was harassed about her decision by phone and in person by 
people she did not know. By way of the medical staff a catholic priest was 
involved, with no question as to the faith of the girl or her family. After a 
long process the girl was allowed an abortion in June 2008, in a hospital 
approximately 500 miles away from her home, in a clandestine manner, 
although the termination was lawful.
247
 
 
The Court found that there had been a violation of articles 3, 8 and 5.1 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The violation under article 8 
was in regard to both applicants concerning the determination of access to 
lawful abortion and the disclosure of the applicants’ personal data. The first 
applicant’s rights under article 5.1 and article 3 were also violated. For the 
relevancy of this thesis, the violation of article 8 in regard to the 
determination of access to lawful abortion is of interest and is discussed 
now. 
 
The reasoning of the Court for a violation under article 8 was that the 
authorities failed to comply with their positive obligation to secure the 
applicants effective respect for their private life. The Court noted that the 
Convention does not confer a right to abortion, cf. Tysiąc v. Poland, A, B, 
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and C v. Ireland and R.R. v. Poland.
248
 The discussion of the Court on this 
issue mirrors the discussion in the three previous cases. The absence of a 
common approach within Europe as to the beginning of life leads to the 
importance of examining national legal solutions as applied to the 
circumstances of the individual case. It is of particular interest that the 
individual rights and the public interest are balanced fairly against one 
another.
249
 
 
The case at hand differed from the cases Tysiąc v. Poland and R.R. v. 
Poland in that it concerns an unwanted pregnancy that was the result from 
rape, one of the grounds under the 1993 Act for lawful abortion (cf. chapter 
4.2).
250
 Even though the first applicant had a right to have effective respect 
of her right to private life under article 8, and thus obtain a lawful abortion, 
the Court noted that the medical staff involved in the applicant’s case did 
not consider themselves obliged to carry out the procedure. Procrastination 
and confusion surrounded the determination of the first applicant’s access to 
legal abortion, and the applicants were given misleading and contradictory 
information.
251
 For the exercise of personal autonomy the effective access to 
reliable information on the condition for the availability of lawful abortion 
and the relevant following procedures are necessary. All the hinders that that 
the applicants met in this time sensitive issue meant that there was a striking 
discordance between the theoretical right to an abortion and the practical 
implementation of such a right.
252
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7 Analysis 
In the previous chapter, the landmark cases on the issue of abortion from the 
European Court of Human Rights were presented. As is evident, Poland and 
Ireland are two of the States in Europe that struggle with ensuring the 
Convention rights of their citizens on the issue of abortion. Although the 
discussion on abortion encompass a battery of rights, such as the right to 
life, the freedom from torture, and the right to effective remedy, the two that 
figure most prominently is the right to private life (article 8) and the 
freedom of expression (article 10). In this chapter, the policy decisions of 
the Council of Europe on gender equality and abortion are analysed together 
with the cases from the European Court of Human Rights. The theories and 
models of explanation that were introduced in chapter 2 are used to form a 
coherent analysis.  
 
The findings of this thesis are summarized in this chapter, showing the 
conclusion and my hopes and recommendations for the future. A moral and 
ethical perspective permeates this analysis, because the issue is moral and 
ethical by definition. 
 
This analysis does not include a discussion of the right to life of the foetus, 
nor is there a discussion on the right to abortion under article 2 in the 
Convention, the right to life. It is an interesting question that inevitably 
comes up when abortion is discussed, but it falls outside the scope of this 
thesis.  
 
7.1 Gender Equality in Decision-Making 
and Its Importance for the Right to 
Abortion 
All human beings are born free and equal. In a utopia where people were 
treated like this, the fight for gender equality would be obsolete. 
Unfortunately, there is a structural discrimination against women. The 
equality between women and men in private and family life is an important 
step of the way to creating a gender equal society.  
 
If women’s voices are not heard, the international human rights lose their 
universal applicability. States and the international order lack women in the 
decision-making process. The Committee of Ministers adopted a 
recommendation to the member states, asking them to work for an equal 
representation of both genders in the public and political life. When women 
are not part of the decision-making process, women’s needs are not reflected 
in the legislation to the same extent that men’s needs are. Why is this 
discrimination in regard to abortion not more politically interesting? It is 
something that potentially affects all women, and in its extension all men. It 
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is strange how the structural discrimination against women do not get the 
proportionate response. An interesting note is that out of the twenty-three 
judges in the case of Open Door and Dublin Woman Well v. Ireland, one 
was a woman. Keeping in mind that this was over twenty years ago, it might 
not be very shocking. However, women continue to hold a 
disproportionately low number of seats in e.g. the European Court of 
Human Rights. The Council of Europe has acknowledged this and is 
working towards a greater gender equality.  
 
The subordination of women is seen by some as a natural state, not possible 
to change with legislation and politics. With this view, women will never 
become more than second-class citizens, and rights that pertain specifically 
to women – such as the right to abortion – will not get international or 
domestic support. The subordination of women is maintained by patriarchal 
interests, values and institutions. Law is shaped by male values; it is made 
for men, by men. Reproductive policies have been based in communitarian 
ideals, in which higher birth numbers means a greater population, which in 
turn is indicative of a powerful State. The problem with this approach is that 
the communitarian ideal does not always match the individual’s needs or 
wants – or rights. Therefore the communitarian ideal may favor a restrictive 
approach towards abortion, when, from a woman’s perspective, a liberal 
abortion policy is preferred. 
 
If women are allowed to take responsibility over their own reproductive 
choices, they are empowered in other areas of life as well, e.g. decision-
making within the household and in economic and educational matters. If 
women are empowered in these spheres, it is not a long way to go before 
women will be participating in political and public decision-making as well, 
leading in turn to a more gender equal legislation over all. This positive 
feedback leads to an ideal society that we should all strive for, because a 
gender equal society is a requirement for genuine democracy, as stated by 
the Committee of Ministers in their 1994 reply to the Parliamentary 
Assembly’s recommendation. The Parliamentary Assembly stressed in its 
recommendation to the Committee of Ministers that the fundamental rights 
of women and girls are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of 
universal human rights. The lack of women in political life has been one of 
the reasons that women’s rights are sometimes seen as secondary to human 
rights in general. However, the number of women in public and political life 
is increasing, and with gender equality in the decision-making powers come 
greater gender equality in the private life of individuals. When gender 
equality is achieved in both the public and the private sphere, the human 
rights of women will no longer be regarded as subordinate rights. The 
Committee of Ministers answered that it was prepared to do its utmost to 
work for the equal participation of men and women in decision-making. 
With the 2003 recommendation the Committee of Ministers sent a clear 
message to the Member States that a balanced representation of women and 
men in public and political decision-making is necessary for a genuine 
democracy and a step on the way to achieve gender equality. It is clear that 
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the Council of Ministers is working towards greater gender equality, but 
social change takes time.  
 
The importance of gender equality in regard to abortion is a two-way street. 
Recalling the statement of the undersigning members of the Parliamentary 
Assembly’s 1992 written declaration, equality in the sphere of private life 
entails that both men and women have the right to respect for their right to 
self-determination and private life, including reproductive choices. The free 
choice of motherhood for women is an established fact in democratic 
societies. The 1992 written declaration noted that the vast majority of 
Member States to the Council of Europe have liberal legislations in regard 
to abortion. Still, the European Court of Human Rights did not find this 
enough to call it a European consensus, choosing not to interpret a right to 
abortion under the Convention in A, B and C v. Ireland.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that women and men face different situations 
in their lives, and it is important to take this into account when working for 
a more gender equal society. The Committee of Ministers pointed this out in 
its 2009 declaration. One such glaringly obvious situation is pregnancy. 
Although men are part of creating a new life, too often women are the ones 
left to face the consequences of sexual relations, as mentioned in the 
Parliamentary Assembly’s resolution from 2004 on how to integrate men 
into issues of reproductive rights. Men care about reproductive rights, but 
their lives are not formed by it (or by the lack of it) in the same way as 
women’s lives. This is again an instance where the equal representation of 
men and women in decision making bodies would make a great impact. 
 
The Council of Europe has recognized the structural discrimination against 
women, both de jure and de facto. Studying the structures of gender 
inequality, it is at the above-individual level these structures can be 
discerned. It is not helpful for the analysis that one medical practitioner in 
one of the Polish cases hinder a woman from obtaining a lawful abortion. 
However, when several medical practitioners in all of the presented Polish 
cases hinder the lawful procedure, this is a pattern and it is indicative of a 
structural discrimination. The medical practitioners acted like they felt no 
obligation to perform a lawful termination of pregnancy, the Court noted in 
P. and S. v. Poland. The lack of procedural safety to ensure the effective 
respect of the women’s right to private life in these cases were appalling. 
The resolution on access to safe and legal abortion in Europe, adopted by 
the Parliamentary Assembly in 2008, urged the Committee of Ministers and 
the Member States to take action towards ensuring access to safe, legal and 
available abortions. It seems that often the call for a less restrictive abortion 
policy and legislation is prefixed by the statement that abortion should not 
be encouraged, but is more of a “necessary evil”. In the report on access to 
safe and legal abortion in Europe the Commission on Equal Opportunities 
for Women and Men stated that abortion should never be considered a 
method of family planning and must be avoided as far as possible. Also in 
the ICPD programme it was stated that in no case should abortion be 
promoted as a method of family planning. 
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Law should be used to work for social change, but policy decisions and 
external pressure must be used to make the law change. Although the 
political will to influence the few States in Europe that still have restrictive 
abortion legislation is present, as seen by the policy decisions of the Council 
of Europe on the issue of abortion and reproductive rights (cf. inter alia 
resolution 1607 (2008) from the Parliamentary Assembly), it is difficult to 
bring social change in a top-down manner. The social change is more 
organic when it stems from the public, which affect the legislation over 
time. As Richardson and Sandland note, the change in law will not come 
from logic within the law itself. It is the external forces that change law, and 
it is welcomed that the Council of Europe is adopting policies on gender 
equality and reproductive rights that will work toward a common European 
consensus on these issues. Some human rights do not grow organically to 
include those who need them the most. Then, action needs to be taken and 
sometimes culture, tradition and religion has to step aside for the rights of 
the individual. The democratic majority should not be able to restrict an 
individual’s right, as Cook writes. The possibility of a democratic majority 
to force a religious view not shared by all the citizens upon them is very 
relevant. In the case of Mrs Halappanavar, as a Hindu, she was refused an 
abortion that could have saved her life because of Roman Catholic values. 
The question Ross poses of whose decision an abortion should be is 
extremely poignant – should the religious majority or the woman in question 
be the one to decide? In both Ireland and Poland the Roman Catholic 
Church has a strong hold; in Ireland almost eighty-five per cent identify as 
Catholic, and in Poland the number is close to ninety per cent. Still, for 
women to have true personal autonomy, I believe the decision of abortion 
should lie with the woman.  
 
Lee wrote that women must be at the centre of the discussion about 
abortion. For a woman to be in control of her life, the woman must also be 
able to control her body. Furthermore, for a woman to have genuine self-
determination, Mr Opsahl and the other Nordic judges in Brüggemann and 
Scheuten v. the FRG support this view in their dissenting opinion. They 
claimed it is the most consistent with the idea of self-determination to leave 
the decision of abortion to the woman herself. Bunch explained it as the 
physical territory of this political struggle is women’s bodies.  
 
The context is important; there are social, economic and cultural aspects to 
consider when analysing the ‘choice’ of abortion. For example, women who 
are poor and live in rural areas may not have the option to have an abortion, 
because it would be too expensive. The resolution 1607 (2008) from the 
Parliamentary Assembly highlighted this issue, and called for more 
inclusive abortion politics in the Member States. In some States, religious 
morals dictate that abortion is wrong, and thus make a great impact on 
women’s choice. Furedi described how women she interviewed told her that 
they thought that abortion was wrong, but for them, it was the best choice 
and the right thing to do. This further supports the statement of the 
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resolution 1607 (2008) that the legality of abortion does not affect women’s 
need for the procedure, only the access to safe and legal abortion.  
 
Information and education on reproductive rights have also been called for 
in several of the policy decisions of the Council of Europe. It is necessary 
for the possibility to make an informed choice in reproductive matters, and 
especially the choice of abortion. Reproductive rights and the right to 
abortion need to be part of the public debate. Men, although they have an 
interest in reproductive rights being regulated, do not hold the same stake in 
the question as women do. For women this is a question of life and death.  
 
Mr Volontè’s question on why the case of A, B and C v. Ireland should get 
precedence when so many other important cases of human rights violations 
are treated in the ordinary procedure shows a complete disregard for how 
restrictive abortion legislation has a negative impact on half the population 
of the world. In this case Mr Volontè embodies the idea that women’s rights 
are not the same as human rights. He has a gendered perception of the law, 
in which “women’s issues” are regarded as secondary.  
 
7.2 Comparison of the Abortion 
Legislation in Ireland, Poland and 
Sweden 
It is important to bear in mind that it is difficult to make a compromise 
where the States keep their sovereignty, but where they can also be affected 
in their stance on certain human rights issues. To achieve the successful 
cooperation of States, the Court cannot alienate them, or take a too strong 
position on issues that have a high moral value within the Member States. 
The Convention is understood to be complementary to the national systems, 
and the enforcement of the decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights and of the Council of Europe ultimately depends on the good faith 
and cooperation of the Contracting States. 
 
Religion is a very important factor in the development of national abortion 
legislation and policies. Both Ireland and Poland are countries with a very 
high percentage of Roman Catholic population. Sweden is a secularized 
country. The influence of religion can be discerned in the legislation. In 
Poland the right to life begins at conception. The Irish Constitution states 
that the mother and the unborn have the equal right to life. In Sweden, the 
Abortion Act of 1975 gives the woman free access to abortion on her own 
application until the eighteenth week of gestation. Using religious or 
cultural traditions as a reason to keep women subordinate to men should not 
be possible. However, in the case of Ireland, the morality of the population 
(as shown in the 1983 referendum) was given considerable weight by the 
European Court of Human Rights in the cases Open Door and Dublin Well 
Woman v. Ireland and A, B and C v. Ireland. The religious morals therefore 
dictated to what extent women decide over their bodies. 
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The differences between the cases from Ireland and Poland is that in Ireland 
the question is in regard to the freedom of expression surrounding abortion, 
and the right to abortion itself – the to be or not to be of legal abortion. In 
the Polish cases, the women have all been entitled to a lawful termination of 
pregnancy under the domestic legislation, and as such the failure of the State 
to ensure the respect for this right meant a violation of article 8. Both 
Ireland and Poland have an exception to their strict abortion laws if the 
pregnant woman’s life is in danger. In Ireland’s case, this does not entail a 
right to have an abortion in Ireland, but an implicit right to travel to another 
State to have an abortion performed. This is both costly and time 
consuming. As is evident from the cases of the European Court of Human 
Rights (cf. supra, chapter 6.2), even though there are exceptions to the ban 
on abortion, it is difficult to obtain an abortion in a country where the 
opposition is great, and where it is also represented by State officials and 
those acting under the State’s authority.  
 
Legality of abortions is not enough to guarantee that all abortions are safe 
abortions. Illegality of abortion, however, leads to conditions under which 
most abortions are unsafe, and this issue is important to solve. In Sweden, a 
State with a liberal abortion legislation, it is interesting to note that the 
number of clandestine abortions is officially zero. The aim with liberal 
abortion legislation is to make sure abortions are regulated and can be 
provided to those who wish to have access to them in a safe and legal 
manner. The resolution on access to safe and legal abortion from the 
Parliamentary Assembly was an important step in showing which way the 
Council of Europe leans on this heavily politicised question. However, the 
failure – or unwillingness – of the Committee of Ministers to make this a 
recommendation to the Member States shows the difficulty in taking a 
strong position on this issue. The political consequence of taking a strong 
view on abortion, e.g. by the European Court of Human Rights interpreting 
a right to abortion under the Convention, could be that Member States like 
Ireland and Poland protest, and maybe even walk out. As stated before, the 
enforcement of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and of 
the Council of Europe ultimately depends on the good faith and cooperation 
of the Contracting States. 
 
When the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Irish Constitution was suggested, 
the fear was that women would start claiming that they were suicidal for 
obtaining an abortion. The Prime Minister of Ireland, when he made that 
statement, voiced a fear of social and eugenic abortion. It is grounded, 
however, in the very real need for abortion. The need for lawful abortion is 
ever-present. As both the WHO report and the report on access to safe and 
legal abortion in Europe pointed out, without a safe and legal alternative of 
abortion, unsafe and clandestine abortions will take place. The legality of 
abortion does not affect the need for abortion, just the accessibility of safe 
abortion.  
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In Ireland, the Court’s decision in A, B and C v. Ireland sparked a debate on 
how to best implement the ruling into Irish legislation, without for that 
matter straying too far from the State sovereignty. An expert committee was 
set up to investigate the implications of the case on Irish legislation. The 
new legislation was proposed in April 2013. With the proposed legislation, 
abortion will be permitted in cases where the pregnant woman’s life is in 
danger, but only if two medical practitioners attest to this in good faith. The 
jail sentence of up to fourteen years if doctors are found to carry out 
“unnecessary” abortions is going to put a damper on the will to carry out the 
procedure. 
 
With this legislation, the Irish Government has followed the ruling in the 
case of A, B and C v. Ireland, which called for a clear and accessible 
regulatory framework. It is not really a liberalisation of the abortion right, 
although it permits abortion in life-or-death situation. It will probably have a 
deterring effect, because medical practitioners will err on the side of caution 
– in this case this does not mean to perform a termination of pregnancy, but 
to wait until it is absolutely clear the there is a “real and substantial” risk to 
life of the woman. The European Court of Human Rights referred to this 
chilling effect in the case of Tysiąc v. Poland, and stated that provisions 
regulating lawful abortion should be clearly formulated in a way to alleviate 
the effect.
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 If there is a legal right to abortion, the legislation must not be 
formulated in such a way that the effective enjoyment of this right is 
blocked. Worth pointing out is that the bill makes it absolutely clear that it is 
the woman’s decision in the end whether to have an abortion or not. This 
can be connected to Denbow’s fear that allowing a “liberal” abortion 
legislation (which this is not, keep in mind) will take away the autonomy of 
women who want to choose a pregnancy, in spite of the societal views of 
e.g. her suitability or her possibility to care for a child. It is important to 
note that although the bill gives the woman the final decision on whether to 
opt out of the procedure or not, it does not give her a right to choose an 
abortion, other than for situations which are life-threatening. The Protection 
of Life during Pregnancy Bill 2013 is not yet adopted. If it is adopted, it is 
too early to know what the impact of it will be.  
 
In a comparison between these three Contracting States to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, it is obvious that the Convention and the 
Court has allowed for a wide margin of appreciation on the issue of 
abortion. In Sweden no reason must be given by the woman for a 
termination of pregnancy, and so it is freely available up until the eighteenth 
week. If the life of the woman is in danger because of the pregnancy, or the 
foetus is not viable, there is no gestational time limit for the abortion either. 
In Poland abortion is illegal except for in a handful of cases. In Ireland 
abortion is illegal except for saving the life of the mother, in limited 
circumstances, but the legislation on this point is not sufficiently clear and 
accessible (cf. A, B and C v. Ireland). 
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7.3 The Protection of the Right to 
Abortion in The Council of Europe 
System 
For the idea of the individual’s human rights and the rule of law, all 
individuals are presumed to have an autonomous sphere. If the State is the 
one to decide over women’s bodies in regard to abortion, then women 
cannot be said to have a right to self-determination or personal autonomy. In 
States where the right to abortion is restricted, women are viewed as 
incapable of taking the right decisions (whichever they might be) in regard 
to abortion. This was evident e.g. in the Swedish patronizing opposition to 
the 1975 Abortion Act.  
 
In the two Irish cases analysed here, the question was if there was a right to 
abortion at all in the State, and if the freedom of expression could be 
restricted on the matter out of a necessity to protect the public morality. In 
the Polish cases, the existence of a possible right to abortion in the Council 
of Europe system was not discussed, as the national legislation had already 
regulated situations in which abortion is lawful. In Tysiąc v. Poland, the 
abortion constituted a risk to health of the mother, in R.R. v. Poland the 
ground for abortion was the suspected malformation of the foetus, and in P. 
and S. v. Poland the pregnancy was the result of a criminal act. Each of 
these cases falls under a situation under which the applicants had a right to 
lawful abortion in the domestic legislation. In all of these cases, the women 
were restricted in their tries to obtain an abortion, both de jure and de facto. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights have focused on two of the rights in 
the Convention when it has met the issue of abortion; the right to private life 
in article 8, and the freedom of expression in article 10. The margin of 
appreciation is applicable for both articles. 
 
In the case of Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, the Court 
avoided the question of the right to abortion, but determined that the 
injunction against the applicants which hindered them from imparting and 
receiving information about abortion services was disproportionate to the 
legitimate aim of the protection of the public morals. To completely silence 
the counselling services on matters of abortion, that are legal in other 
Contracting States, and which may be crucial to women’s life, health or 
well-being, is an overly broad restriction. It can be seen that the Court held 
that the right to receive and impart information on matters that are of central 
importance for women’s lives, health and well-being cannot be restricted 
unless they are proportionate to a legitimate aim.  
 
The right to private life under article 8 of the Convention in regard to 
abortion have been discussed at length in the European Court of Human 
Rights. From the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it is 
clear that the question of the right to abortion can be divided into two 
questions under the article 8 right to private life in the Convention; the right 
 63 
to abortion, and the right to effective respect for the rights under the 
convention.  
 
In Tysiąc v. Poland the Court found that the State had failed to comply with 
its positive obligations to secure to the applicant the effective respect for her 
private life. The Court referred to Brüggemann and Scheuten v. the FRG and 
repeated that legislation on the matter of interrupting pregnancy touches 
upon the sphere of private life. An individual’s social and physical identity 
is part of the meaning of private life within the Convention. Consequently, 
so is her personal autonomy and development. This was reiterated in A, B 
and C v. Ireland, R.R. v. Poland and P. and S. v. Poland. The State has a 
positive obligation to secure to its citizens their right to effective respect for 
their physical and psychological integrity under article 8 of the Convention. 
This means that where the State has adopted a regulatory framework on 
abortion, the physical integrity of a pregnant woman must be included in the 
assessment of the State’s positive obligation to secure it. The State must 
ensure the legal protection of the Convention rights. If the rights 
safeguarded in the Convention are nothing more than theoretical or illusory, 
the Council of Europe system does not work. 
 
In Tysiąc v. Poland, the Court explicitly stated that it did not find it to be the 
Court’s task to examine whether abortion is a right guaranteed under the 
Convention, because in this case there was already a national right to the 
procedure under certain circumstances. As such, the right to have effective 
respect of a right that falls under the scope of article 8 – which legislation of 
abortion does, according to the Court in the case and also in R.R. v. Poland 
and P. and S. v. Poland – must be ensured by the State. 
 
In A, B and C v. Ireland the Court pressed on the fact that “private life” 
concerns, among other aspects, a person’s physical and psychological 
integrity and the decision whether or not to have a child. The Court 
reiterated that legislation regulating the interruption of pregnancy touches 
upon the sphere of the private life of the woman, and although article 8 
cannot be interpreted as conferring a right to abortion, pregnancy and the 
termination of pregnancy pertain uniquely to the woman’s private life. 
 
The pregnant woman’s right to life must be weighed against competing 
interests. In the Irish Constitution, equal protection is given to the life of the 
mother and the unborn, but when this balancing means that the choice is 
between a dying foetus and the mother, the text has been exceedingly 
unclear. This is what happened in in the tragic incident of Mrs 
Halappanavar. She and her foetus had equal right to life according to the 
Irish Constitution, but even though Mrs Halappanavar was miscarrying, the 
legislation was not clear enough to ensure that the medical practitioners 
knew what to do. The Court concluded in A, B and C v. Ireland that a 
regulatory framework with an accessible and effective procedure for 
establishing whether or not a woman qualifies for a lawful abortion in 
Ireland in accordance with article 40.3.3 of the Constitution was needed to 
safeguard the Convention right of private life. The Expert Group presented 
 64 
their report on how to make the Irish national law comply with the 
judgement in A, B and C v. Ireland only a month after the death of Mrs 
Halappanavar. The bill following this report was discussed above.  
 
The Court also discussed the prohibition in Ireland of abortion on the 
ground of health and well-being in the case of A, B and C v. Ireland. It 
found that the prohibition of abortion for health or well-being reasons 
constituted an interference with the right to private life. However, the 
interference was found to be justified under the second paragraph of article 
8, fulfilling the requirements of being in accordance with the law, and being 
necessary in a democratic society for legitimate aims specified in the article.  
 
As to the legitimate aim of the interference, the Court referred to the 1992 
case Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland and the 1983 Irish 
referendum on the stance of the majority of the Irish people on abortion. The 
applicants argued that the will of the Irish public had changed since the 
1983 referendum. The Court, however, did not see that the changes in Irish 
law (cf. supra, chapter 4.1 on the rejection of restrictive amendments to the 
Constitution and the adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution) demonstrated a relevant change of public opinion. The 
Court reiterated that State authorities are in principle in a better position to 
give an opinion on the content of the requirements of morals in their State, 
and also in a better position to assess the necessity of a restriction intended 
to meet them. It was within Ireland’s margin of appreciation because of the 
lacking European consensus, and the importance of the public interest. Even 
though a majority of the Contracting States to the Convention have a 
consensus on abortion that is more liberal than the legislation in Ireland, the 
Court did not consider this to decisively narrow the broad margin of 
appreciation of Ireland. The applicants had not shown sufficiently indicative 
evidence of a change of the public mind either.  
 
The applicants A and B still had the option of travelling abroad for an 
abortion and this information was freely available to them. Therefore, the 
Irish prohibition of abortion on health and welfare grounds did not exceed 
the margin of appreciation accorded to the State.  
 
In the case A, B and C v. Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights left 
the door open for a scenario in which they could narrow the State’s margin 
of appreciation so much as to confer a right to abortion under the 
Convention. If the first and second applicants had shown that the public’s 
morality in the question of abortion had changed since the 1983 referendum, 
the Court hinted that the margin of appreciation of the State on the issue 
would have been made more narrow. 
 
In R.R. v. Poland, the Court reiterated that any interference with the right to 
private life must be justified by the Convention. The positive obligation of 
the State to respect the right to private life entails a right to the effective 
respect for its citizens’ physical and psychological integrity. The physical 
and psychological integrity includes the protection of individual’s rights and 
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the implementation of specific measures in the context of abortion, as the 
Court had already stated in Tysiąc v. Poland and A, B and C v. Ireland.  
 
The Court referred to the evolutive interpretation of the Convention in R.R. 
v. Poland. The evolutive interpretation reflects that the Convention is a 
living instrument, and that it must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions. Again, the Court took the position that because the issue of 
when life begins, and from what point in time it is protected, is not resolved 
within the majority of the Member States, the issue of abortion is within the 
State’s margin of appreciation. The Court reiterated that the legal 
framework should reflect under which circumstances abortion are permitted 
in the State in a coherent manner, adequately weighing the conflicting 
interests and in accordance with the Convention. The competing interests of 
the individual and the community must be fairly balanced. The 
Conventional rights are not supposed to be theoretical or illusory, and there 
must be legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public authorities 
provided in the domestic law, or the rule of law is undermined.  
 
In 2012, in P. and S. v. Poland, the Court found again that the authorities 
failed to comply with their positive obligation to secure for the applicants 
the effective respect for their private life. Again, The Court noted that the 
Convention does not confer a right to abortion. The continued absence of a 
common understanding within Europe of when life begins left the question 
of balancing the individual’s rights against the public interest to the State. 
 
Even though the first applicant had a right to have effective respect of her 
right to private life under article 8 and obtain a lawful abortion, the medical 
staff involved in the applicant’s case did not consider themselves obliged to 
carry out the procedure. For the exercise of personal autonomy, the effective 
access to reliable information and the availability of lawful abortion are 
necessary. The applicants were met by many hinders in this time sensitive 
issue, effectively meaning that there was a disaccord between the theoretical 
right to an abortion and the practical implementation of such a right. 
 
The ability to make decisions free from external pressure is a fundamental 
part of being a free individual, as Eriksson points out, and the control over 
one’s own body is a prerequisite for full human participation in social and 
communal life. The Court has noted that this right to self-determination falls 
under the scope of article 8 and although it has not - yet – used the evolutive 
interpretation to confer a right to abortion in the Convention, it has left the 
possibility open.  
 
The conclusion to be drawn from how the Court has debated the issue of 
abortion under article 8 is that as long as there is no European consensus on 
from which point in time the right to life is protected, the Court will not take 
a stance in this question. However, in A, B and C v. Ireland, the Court 
hinted at restricting the margin of appreciation of a State on the issue of 
abortion. If the applicants had shown that the public morals in Ireland no 
longer were reflected by the outcome in the 1983 referendum, that the right 
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to abortion now was supported by the public, the Court could have found 
that the restriction of the article 8 right to life was not made in pursuit of a 
legitimate aim, and could have thus deemed the restrictive legislation as 
being in violation of the Convention rights.  
 
As was discussed above, it is important to remember that the Council of 
Europe system is built on the good will and cooperation of the Contracting 
States. The margin of appreciation will only be restricted when a 
particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at 
stake, according to the Court in A, B and C v. Ireland. However, the right to 
personal autonomy and the psychological and physical integrity of women 
should be interpreted to be a particularly important facet of an individual’s 
existence or identity, in my opinion. Therefore, the Court should use the 
evolutive interpretation, which means that it should interpret the Convention 
in the light of present-day conditions. Like Cook writes, the Convention is 
made to protect the vulnerable that otherwise would be powerless. Even if 
the State or those acting under the authority of the State are acting in 
accordance with the democratic will, this should not be reason to oppress a 
group of people. Given that the Irish public have started to change its 
position on the right to abortion (cf. chapter 4.1), and that the vast majority 
of the Member States of the Council of Europe have enacted some form of 
abortion legislation, the European consensus should be strong enough to 
affect the Court’s decision in a way to interpret a right of abortion under the 
Convention.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Court has not taken a stance on the issue of abortion, 
stating that for as long as there is no European consensus on the matter, the 
Court cannot use the evolutive interpretation to interpret that the right to 
private life under article 8 confer a right to abortion. From the European 
Court of Human Right’s case law it is clear that, at this time, there is no 
right to abortion under the Convention. However, in Member States where 
abortion is lawful the Member State has a positive obligation to protect the 
individual’s effective right to private life under the Convention. The Court 
did not take the opportunity to interpret a right of abortion into the 
Convention in the case of A, B and C v. Ireland, but it left an opening for 
possibly narrowing a State’s margin of appreciation on the issue in the 
future. Furthermore, the right to abortion is somewhat protected in the 
Council of Europe system under the article 10 right to receive and impart 
information. 
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